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I.  Introduction 
 
Suppose that you face charges for driving under the influence.  Knowing that a 
conviction will expose you to incarceration, fines, and loss of your driver’s license, you 
hire an attorney in whom you have confidence.  Guided by counsel, you go through trial, 
and are convicted.  After sentencing, you ask counsel about filing an appeal.  When 
counsel informs you that she cannot represent you on appeal you learn for the first time 
that a few days before your trial your lawyer accepted a position as Chief Assistant 
District Attorney with the office prosecuting you in the case.2  Are you confident that 
counsel gave you the zealous representation you expect, or do you fear that counsel may 
have pulled her punches or, even worse, shared information with her new employer?  
Should someone have told you that your attorney had agreed to switch sides?  Was the 
trial fair?  Are you entitled to any relief? 
 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  I am indebted to Christian Piccolo, Meghan 
Klaric, Keri Engelman, and Jacqueline Gorbey for their excellent research assistance, and to Villanova 
University School of Law for its generous support. 
2 This hypothetical is based on the facts of Reeves v. State, 497 S.E.2d 625 (Ga. App. 1998) 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492309
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Put yourself in the shoes of a different criminal defendant.  You are charged with 
a sexual offense and facing a possible life sentence.  You hire a criminal defense attorney 
with a strong reputation.  On the eve of trial, the attorney moves to withdraw, but the 
court denies the motion.  Rejecting the prosecution’s offer of a plea to reduced charges, 
you go through trial and are convicted of the most serious charges. Only after conviction 
do you learn that your attorney had personally been battling the criminal justice system 
while representing you.  The attorney was indicted on felony drug charges shortly after 
being hired for your case and pleaded guilty to reduced charges about a month after your 
conviction.3  At sentencing you are represented by a new, court-appointed attorney, since 
your attorney’s license has been suspended.  You receive a long sentence of 
incarceration.  As you sit in prison, do you question the quality of the representation you 
received?  Would you have chosen to continue with your retained attorney had you 
known that the attorney was charged with a felony?  Did your attorney, the prosecutor, or 
the trial judge have a duty to inform you of your attorney’s legal problem?  Was the trial 
fair?  Are you entitled to any relief? 
 
For our criminal justice system to function properly both the prosecution and 
defense must free to provide robust representation uninhibited by conflicts of interest.4  
Currently, concerns raised by wide-spread ineffective assistance of counsel undermine 
confidence in our criminal justice system.5  Deficient assistance of counsel can result 
from counsel’s incompetency or from a conflict of interest.  Claims based on a conflict of 
interest are of special importance because a conflict – the claim that the attorney served 
two masters -- creates an even greater appearance of unfairness both to the defendant and 
to the general public than a mere claim that the attorney was incompetent.6  As lawyers, 
we should be concerned with the appearance of unfairness as well as provable unfairness 
and should seek actively to eliminate deficient defense representation.7   
                                                 
3 This hypothetical is based on the facts of Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 811-13 (6th Cir. 2002). 
4 In United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit elaborated on the importance 
of uninhibited counsel:  
If there is any constraint on counsel’s complete and exuberant presentation, our system 
will fail because the basic ingredient of the adversary system will be missing.  The 
essence of the system is that there be professional antagonists in the legal forum, dynamic 
disputants prepared to do combat for the purpose of aiding the court in its quest to do 
justice. 
644 F.2d at 136.  See also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD AND W. WILLIAM HODES THE LAW OF LAWYERING, 10-
12-10-13 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that “[i]n the modern view, a conflict of interest exists whenever the 
attorney-client relations or the quality of the representation is ‘at risk,’ even if no substantive impropriety – 
such as a breach of confidentiality or less than zealous representation - in fact eventuates”) (emphasis in 
original). 
5 See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Claims, 92 CORN. L. REV. 679, 680-88 (2007) (discussing problem); William J. Stuntz, The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1997) 
(criticizing standard for protecting defendants from ineffective assistance). 
6 See Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant’s Right to Competent Counsel: It’s Time for Some 
Standards!, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 129, 152-53 (2005).   
7 See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (emphasizing trial court’s concern with appearance 
of fairness); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 166 (1988) (recognizing importance of fairness in trial 
process).  See also HAZARD AND HODES, supra note 4, at 10-12 (stating that interest in maintaining public 
confidence in legal system may outweigh individual interests). 
Conflicts and Prosecutors – page 3 
 
This article explores two types of conflicts of interest which threaten to inhibit 
zealous defense representation: (1) when defense counsel has, had, or seeks employment 
as a prosecutor; and (2) when defense counsel is faced with criminal charges while 
simultaneously representing a criminal defendant.  Both these situations pose a conflict 
for counsel and also create an appearance of unfairness. The common thread in cases 
involving these types of conflict is that, the prosecution has ready access to information 
pertinent to the conflict, while neither the court nor the defendant, and sometimes not 
even counsel, will be aware of the problem. 
 
When such a conflict threatens to impair the defendant’s representation, it is 
critical to raise it as early as possible.  If the conflict is raised before trial, the trial court 
can determine whether there is a serious problem, let the defendant decide whether to 
waive conflict-free representation for that case, or disqualify counsel.8  If the issue not 
raised until after conviction, the defendant will have difficulty obtaining relief.  The mere 
appearance of unfairness is not a basis for post-conviction relief.  Instead, if the conflict 
comes to light only after conviction, the defendant must either show that the conflict 
adversely affected counsel’s representation of the defendant in some specific way or must 
meet the more demanding standard of showing that counsel was incompetent and that the 
incompetence prejudiced the defendant. 
 
The article examines conflict situations in which the prosecution has special 
access to information regarding the conflicts – 1) cases in which defense counsel has an 
employment relation with the prosecutor’s office and 2) cases in which defense counsel 
faces criminal investigation or charges.  Section II provides an overview of the 
constitutional analysis of and relief for defense counsel conflicts of interest.  Section III 
discusses the importance and benefit of early intervention.  Section IV considers the 
possible conflict when counsel has, had, or is seeking employment as a prosecutor.  
Section V examines cases in which counsel is charged with a crime or is under 
investigation for criminal activity.  Section VI argues that, given the difficulty of 
obtaining post-conviction relief and the benefit of early intervention, the prosecution 
should have the burden of discovering and disclosing the relevant facts before trial and 
raising the question of counsel’s possible conflict.   
 
II.  The Constitution and Post-Conviction Relief for Conflicts of Interest 
 
When a defendant is represented by an attorney who arguably labored under a 
conflict of interest, the defendant may be entitled to post-conviction relief based if the 
                                                 
8 Of course, in some cases the trial court is made aware of the conflict but nevertheless fails to properly 
address the problem.  See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); People v. Good, 877 N.Y.S.2d 
766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (discussing how County Court permitted defense counsel to withdraw after 
accepting position with District Attorney’s office but failed to inform defendant of possible conflict or give 
defendant opportunity to waive conflict); People v. Gaines, 716 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) 
(noting that trial court was informed when counsel took a job with the prosecutor’s office and permitted 
counsel to withdraw but did not inform defendant or seek a waiver).  
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defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated.9  Once the defendant has been 
convicted, the courts ask whether counsel had a conflict of interest that interfered with 
the representation of the defendant to a degree that violated the defendant’s sixth 
amendment right to counsel.10  The court will be concerned only with the reliability of the 
trial’s outcome, requiring the defendant to demonstrate why the court should not trust the 
outcome, and thus creating a high hurdle for the defendant to overcome.11  Even if the 
defendant was represented by a conflicted attorney, the conviction is likely to stand.12  
The Supreme Court limits reversals on constitutional grounds to cases in which the 
defendant’s trial was demonstrably unfair or the circumstances raise a serious question 
about the fairness of the trial.  
                                                 
9 The defendant does not necessarily prevail simply because counsel failed to comply with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Constitution does not encompass the 
rules of professional responsibility. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (explaining that 
defects in assistance which do not affect the trial’s outcome do not violate constitutional rights); Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“[A] court must be 
careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as 
to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct . . . .”); Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 
668, 688 (1984) (noting that the Sixth Amendment does not establish specific “requirements of effective 
assistance”).   See also Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that rules 
governing conflicted defense counsel are not intended to enforce the rules of professional responsibility); 
Skinner v. Duncan, 2003 WL 21386032 at * 48 n.85 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that Court has repeatedly 
rejected argument that a breach of ethical standards violates the right to effective assistance). Conversely, 
there is no reason to assume that defendant must establish that the conflicted representation also violated 
the rules of professional responsibility in order to prevail on a constitutional claim.  See Jeffrey Scott 
Glassman, Note, Mickens v. Taylor: The Court’s New Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy for Attorneys Faced 
with a Conflict of Interest, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT., 919, 972-73 (2004) (suggesting that 
violation of ethical rule should raise rebuttable presumption of prejudice).  
10 The question is somewhat different when a state prisoner challenges a state court conviction.  Under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court action is reviewed deferentially and 
will be upheld unless it represents unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d) (West 2008).  See Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that trial 
court credited counsel’s testimony and consequently rejected defendant’s claim of conflict); Tueros v. 
Greiner, 343 F.3d 587, 591 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing standard); Rubin v. Gee, 292 F.3d 396, 400-01 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (stating standard); Smith v. Hofbauer, 321 F.3d 809, 817-18 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing 
ambiguity about what constitutes a conflict of interest under Sullivan). 
11 See John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley Materiality, 
Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1153 (2005) 
(discussing courts’ assessment of reliability and centrality of concept to effective assistance of counsel 
guarantee).  Some states grant more protection under the state constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Cottle, 946 
A.2d 550, 562 (N.J. 2008) (discussing difference between state and federal constitutional protection). 
12 See, e.g., Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that although defense 
counsel was equally involved in the cocaine related transactions, the conviction stood since defendant was 
fully aware and understood the conflict); Sanchez v. Arkansas, 756 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Ark. 1988) (noting 
that defense counsel was charged with assault during the time when he represented defendant but defendant 
did not suffer any prejudice to warrant post-conviction relief).  For a discussion of the various standards 
applied by courts, see infra notes 13-41 and accompanying text.  The difference in perspective between 
pre-trial and post-conviction consideration of conflicts may explain why the Court departs from standard 
terminology (“conflict of interest”) and instead discusses actual conflicts, looking for identifiable adverse 
effect on counsel’s conduct.  See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,172 n.5 (2002) (explaining use of 
“actual conflict”).  See also Craig M. Bradley, Supreme Court Review: The Right to Unconflicted Counsel, 
38 TRIAL 62, 62-64 (June 2002) (discussing difference between conflicts, actively representing conflicting 
interests, and adverse effect); Joy, supra note 12, at 41 (Spring 2002) (discussing terminology). 
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The Court’s approach to challenges based on violations of the defendant’s right to 
counsel does not even effectively protect defendants from the deficiencies of defense 
counsel.  In most cases where the defendant complains of counsel’s poor representation, 
the standard defined in Strickland v. Washington13 controls.  Under Strickland, the 
defendant must establish some specific incompetent act or omission by counsel.  
Additionally, the defendant must prove that counsel’s incompetence prejudiced the 
defendant by showing a reasonable probability that, but for the incompetence, the result 
would have been different.  The Strickland standard is difficult to satisfy, making it hard 
for defendants to get relief for ineffective assistance of counsel based on incompetence.14  
This approach ensures that some convictions will be affirmed simply because the 
defendant cannot identify the specific failure of the counsel or prove the prejudice even 
though the defendant in fact suffered prejudice due to counsel’s shortcomings. 
 
The Court has taken a more protective stance in cases where counsel suffered 
from a conflict of interest.  In Holloway v. Arkansas, 15 the Court presumed prejudice and 
granted the defendants’ reversal based on the trial court’s failure to fulfill its obligations.  
In Holloway, defense counsel was assigned to represent three codefendants.  Counsel 
objected and asked for substitute counsel, informing the court that the multiple 
representation created a conflict of interest.16  The trial court took no action, forcing 
counsel to proceed through trial representing all three defendants.  In that situation, the 
Court held the defendant was entitled to relief without any specific showing of prejudice 
or even impact on counsel’s performance. 
 
The Court also recognized the obligation of the trial court in Wood v. Georgia.17 
In Wood, the Court realized when it was reviewing the defendants’ equal protection claim 
that the three indigent defendants had been represented by a single lawyer who worked 
for their employer and their employer had paid the attorney's fees.18  The record also 
suggested a divergence between the defendants’ interests and those of the employer.  As 
a result, the Court concluded that the trial court had a duty to inquire about the possible 
conflict and remanded the case, directing the trial court to determine whether there was 
an actual conflict.19 
 
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,20 the Court established a somewhat more lenient test in 
cases where the defendant proved that counsel had labored under an actual conflict of 
                                                 
13 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
14 See Williams, supra note 5, at 139-41 (discussing difficulty of satisfying Strickland test); Blume, supra 
note 11, at 1165-68(discussing Strickland test); Donald J. Hall, Effectiveness of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 225, 225-29 (2003-04) (criticizing test, particularly as applied in capital cases); 
Glassman, supra note 9, at 926-33  (discussing Strickland).  See also State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550, 561-63 
(N.J. 2008) (illustrating difficulty of satisfying Strickland test and benefit of more protective test applied 
when counsel has a conflict). 
15 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
16 435 U.S. at 478-480. 
17 450 U.S. 261 (1981). 
18 450 U.S. at 272. 
19 450 U.S. at 273. 
20 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
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interest, even if the trial court was not on notice of the conflict.21  Sullivan established 
that if the defendant shows that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that 
the conflict had an adverse effect on counsel’s performance, the court will presume 
prejudice.22  The Sullivan presumption serves as a prophylactic protection in cases where 
prejudice is likely and the Strickland test provides inadequate protection of the 
defendant’s right to counsel.23   
 
More recently, in Mickens v. Taylor,24 the Court limited the impact of Sullivan.  
The Mickens Court advanced two critical limitations on the constitutional rules governing 
post-conviction relief for conflicts of interest.25  First, the Court questioned whether the 
full range of conflicts that the lower courts have evaluated under the Sullivan test 
warranted such treatment, suggesting that the Sullivan presumption may apply only in 
cases of concurrent representation of codefendants.26  Second, the Court restricted the 
cases in which the trial court’s failure to identify and address a conflict would result in 
reversal, emphasizing that in most conflict cases the defendant must establish that a 
conflict adversely affected defense counsel’s performance.27   
 
First, Mickens seems to suggest that only conflicts arising from concurrent 
representation of codefendants are to be analyzed under the Sullivan standard28 and that 
                                                 
21 446 U.S. at 348-50.  The defendant must establish an actual conflict.  If counsel subjectively but 
mistakenly believes she has divided loyalty, the possibility that counsel’s subjective belief resulted in a 
violation of the defendant’s right to effective assistance is more likely to be evaluated under Strickland than 
Sullivan.  See Tueros v. Greiner, 343 F.3d 587, 597-98 (2d Cir. 2003). 
22 See Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the two tests and describing 
Sullivan as imposing a “lighter burden”); Tueros v. Greiner, 343 F.3d 587, 592 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing 
the two tests).  See also McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 705 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining adverse 
effect); Wright v. Smith, 2007 WL 2412248 at *7 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing meaning of adverse effect). 
23 Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 874 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding it was proper to apply Sullivan to successive representation); People v. 
Rundle, 180 P.3d 224, 548 (Cal. 2008).   
24 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002). 
25 I will not fully reprise the facts and opinions in Mickens.  A number of other authors have already done 
so.  See generally Bradley, supra note 12, at 62-63(discussing Mickens); The Supreme Court, 2001 Term — 
Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 242, 242-51 (2002) (discussing Mickens); Joy, supra note 12, at 
40(discussing Mickens and tests applied in conflict cases before Mickens and defined in Sullivan, Wood, 
and Holloway); Glassman, supra note 9, at 947-65(discussing Mickens).  This article does not critique 
Mickens, but only seeks to consider how the law should develop going forward. 
26 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174-75 (2002).See also Echols v. State, 127 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Ark. 
2003) (noting that Court did not determine whether Sullivan test applies to conflicts other than those 
created by concurrent representation). 
27 535 U.S. at 173-74. See also United States ex rel. Unger v. Pierce, 2003 WL 22872123 at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
2003) (noting that Mickens requires proof of actual conflict and adverse effect). 
28 Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 618-19 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that Sullivan applies only to concurrent 
representation).  See Scott A. Levin, Note, An Open Question? The Effect of Cuyler v. Sullivan on 
Successive Representation After Mickens v. Taylor, 40 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 3 (2004) (looking at question 
of whether Mickens extends Sullivan standard to future successive representation questions); Mark W. 
Shiner, Note, Conflicts of Interest Challenges Post Mickens v. Taylor: Redefining the Defendant’s Burden 
in Concurrent, Successive, and Personal Interest Conflicts, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 965, 980-96(2003) 
(discussing reach of Sullivan rule before and after Mickens).  See also Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 
778, 782 (8th Cir. 2002) (considering the question before Mickens was decided and remarking that 
“loyalties divided between codefendants necessarily will infect the very core of at least one's defense, and 
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conflicts other than concurrent representation should be assessed under the Strickland 
standard.  One way of conceptualizing the Mickens limitation of the Sullivan test is to 
view conflicts as falling into three categories – cases of concurrent representation, cases 
of successive representation, and cases where counsel’s self-interest is at odds with the 
defendant’s – and to apply Sullivan only in cases of concurrent representation.29  Read 
this way, Mickens leads to the conclusion that a defendant complaining of a conflict of 
interest based on something other than concurrent representation can get post-conviction 
relief only by establishing actual prejudice.30  This reading of Mickens fails to adequately 
protect against the full range of conflicts that undermine counsel’s representation of the 
defendant.31 
 
One crucial question about Mickens’ impact, then, is whether some conflicts not 
involving concurrent representation of codefendants warrant a presumption of prejudice 
if shown to have adversely affected counsel’s performance.  It can be argued that 
Sullivan’s presumption of prejudice should extend to any case in which prejudice from 
defense counsel’s conflict is likely and proof of prejudice sufficiently elusive.32  Some 
                                                                                                                                                 
prejudice should be presumed.  However, the same impact will not be found automatically in other conflict 
situations”). 
29 For a further discussion of Mickens, see supra notes 24-28, and infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.  
See also Shiner, supra note 28, at 996-98 (drawing line between concurrent representation and conflicts 
involving the attorney’s self-interest, arguing that conflicts involving the attorney’s personal interest are 
less serious).  However, Shiner focuses on conflicts arising from counsel’s pecuniary interests – the 
prospect of profiting from the defendant’s case.  Id. at 1003-04.  He argues that the Sullivan standard 
should apply only in cases of concurrent representation.  Id.  A defendant who complains that counsel 
suffered from a conflict because counsel’s self-interest was at odds with the defendant’s interest would 
have to satisfy the outcome-oriented test of prejudice established in Strickland.  Id. at 1004-05. 
30 See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting application of Sullivan where 
counsel refrained from vigorous cross examination of fellow attorneys in public defender’s office); Alberni 
v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 873 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that Mickens suggests a more stringent rule for 
successive representation cases); Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005) (reading Mickens as 
clearly limiting Sullivan analysis to cases of concurrent representation); United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 
911, 915 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (summarizing Eighth Circuit’s understanding that Mickens extends Sullivan 
only to “multiple or serial representation”); Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 818 (6th Cir. 2002) (refusing 
to extend Sullivan to conflict based on counsel’s pending drug charges); Skinner v. Duncan, 2003 WL 
21386032 at *47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (refusing to extend Sullivan test to conflict claims involving counsel 
under indictment); People v. Rundle, 180 P.3d 224, 548 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that defendant did not 
satisfy Strickland although he did establish that conflict arising from counsel’s self-interest affected 
counsel’s performance).  See also Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(summarizing authority and concluding question is open); Wright v. Smith, 2007 WL 2412248 at *7 n.13 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing lack of clarity after Mickens). 
31 Some courts continue to assess other types of conflicts under the Sullivan test. See, e.g., Hall v. United 
States, 371 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2004) (disregarding dissent and applying test to concurrent 
representation stating that the test also applies when counsel must choose between counsel’s personal 
interests and those of the defendant); Alessi v. State, 969 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting 
that the Florida courts continue to apply Sullivan to all conflicts). 
32 See John Capone, Supreme Court Review, Facilitating Fairness: The Judge’s Role in the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Effective Counsel, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 905 (2003).  See also Rugiero 
v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 906 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (concluding that the reasons for presuming 
prejudice under Sullivan were present where counsel faced criminal investigation while representing the 
defendant and noting that the Sullivan rule rests on “(1) the high probability of prejudice arising from the 
conflict and (2) the difficulty of proving that prejudice”); People v. Rundle, 180 P.3d 224, 548 (Cal. 2008) 
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courts have adopted this approach and applied Sullivan to cases involving conflicts other 
than concurrent representation, reasoning that the conflict before the court raised at least 
as serious concerns.33   
 
Second, in Mickens, the Court severely limited the circumstances in which the 
trial court’s failure to identify and address a conflict of interest would lead to automatic 
reversal.  Mickens held that a presumption of prejudice is justified only if counsel objects 
to being required to represent conflicting interests and the trial court does not determine 
whether there is a conflict.34  Even though the trial court in Mickens had failed to inquire 
into a potential conflict about which it knew or should have known, the defendant’s 
burden was not reduced; the defendant was required to demonstrate that counsel labored 
under an actual conflict which adversely affected his performance.35  Thus the defendant 
is entitled to reversal based on the trial court’s failing only if counsel makes a timely 
objection and the trial court forces counsel to represent codefendants, unless the trial 
court determines there is no conflict.36  This appears to be the rule that will govern cases 
going forward.37 
                                                                                                                                                 
(declining to apply presumption and stating that presumption will apply “[o]nly when the court concludes 
that the possibility of prejudice and the corresponding difficulty in demonstrating such prejudice are 
sufficiently great compared to other more customary assessments of the detrimental effects of deficient 
performance by defense counsel”).  Cf. Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to 
extend Sullivan and noting that defendant would not encounter difficulty proving prejudice if it was 
present). 
33 See Rubin v. Gee, 292 F.3d 396, 402 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that standard applied to conflict 
created by counsel’s involvement in defendant’s acts to evade being arrested for murder because conflict 
was so serious); People v. Miera, 183 P.3d 672, 675 (Colo. App. 2008) (stating that question of standard for 
conflicts other than concurrent representation is open after Mickens and applying Sullivan to serious 
conflict resulting from successive representation).  See also State v. Lopez, 835 A.2d 126, 133 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2003) (holding trial court did not fulfill its obligation and reasoning that strict standard applied because 
counsel’s role as a material witness was an actual conflict and compromised the structural integrity of the 
trial); Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that Sullivan applied in the 
particular case of consecutive representation because the earlier and later representations were so closely 
related).  Conversely, if the situation is both common and not fraught with prejudice, the court will not 
extend Sullivan.  See Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has only applied the Sullivan standard in cases where: “(1) prejudice was obvious . . . or where there 
was a ‘high probability of prejudice;’ and (2) it was difficult to prove that prejudice”) (citing Mickens v. 
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 (2002)).   
34 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173-74 (2002).  See also Glassman, supra note 9,at 959 (discussing 
limitation on duty of court).  See generally Capone, supra note 32, at 907-10 (discussing and criticizing 
Mickens’ approach to the trial court’s limited role in identifying and addressing conflicts); Glassman, supra 
note 9, at 959 (discussing Court’s approach to trial court’s obligation). 
35 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002).  See also Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 872 (9th Cir. 
2006) (holding that defendant must show actual conflict and adverse affect even though trial court failed to 
inquire properly); Pratt v. Upstate Corr. Facility, 413 F. Supp. 2d 228, 246 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that 
defendant must establish adverse effect even though trial court knew of possible conflict and took no 
action). 
36 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002). 
37 See Wright v. Smith, 2007 WL 2412248 at *8 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (understanding that Mickens does not 
provide for per se reversal when the trial court does not inquire concerning potential conflict due to 
successive representation); Townsend v. State, 85 S.W.3d 526, 528-30 (Ark. 2002) (holding defendant was 
not entitled to reversal merely because court failed to explore alleged conflict created by defendant’s civil 
suit against counsel filed shortly before trial was scheduled to start); People v. Cornwell, 117 P.3d 622, 
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Thus, even if the trial court should have known of the conflict, a defendant whose 
counsel suffered from a conflict based either on counsel’s employment relationship with 
the government or counsel’s own criminal charges is unlikely to win automatic reversal 
based on the failure of the trial court.  Instead, the defendant will have to argue for 
reversal on other grounds, generally seeking relief under the Sullivan rule (proving an 
actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s performance) or under Strickland 
(proving incompetence and prejudice).   
 
Although the Sullivan standard is easier to satisfy than the Strickland requirement 
that the defendant show prejudice, the defendant receives the presumption of prejudice 
only if she can show an actual conflict that had an adverse impact on counsel’s 
performance.38  Courts have recognized the challenge of establishing an adverse effect. 39  
Ordinarily, to do so, the defendant must persuade the court to hold a hearing and then 
demonstrate a link between counsel’s compromised position and some specific action 
taken (or not taken) in defense of the case.40  The prosecutor and counsel may testify at 
the hearing, both with a strong interest in refuting the defendant’s claim that counsel did 
not provide effective assistance.41  As a result, a defendant who succeeds in getting a 
hearing and establishing a conflict may nevertheless be unable to prove adverse effect.  
                                                                                                                                                 
639-40 (Cal. 2005) (concluding that even if trial court’s inquiry was not adequate, defendant would have to 
establish that counsel’s conflict based on his prior representation of government witness adversely affected 
his conduct); Duvall v. State, 923 A.2d 81, 95-98 (Md. 2007) (holding that Mickens required reversal where 
counsel informed court of conflict and court took no action but forced counsel to continue).  But see State 
v. Lopez , 835 A.2d 126, 130-33 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (concluding that defendant’s rights were violated 
because trial court failed to inquire and concluding that duty to inquire was triggered even though counsel 
did not raise the issue).   
38 Mickens appears to raise a question about the necessary showing, stating “prejudice will be presumed 
only if the conflict has significantly affected counsel's performance-thereby rendering the verdict 
unreliable.”  535 U.S. 162, 173 (2002).  Whether the requirement that the defendant show significant effect 
and the specific requirement that the showing suggest unreliability of the verdict represent an enhanced 
burden on the defendant is unclear.  Exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this article. 
39 See, e.g., Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court determination that 
defendant had not shown conflict or adverse effect); United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1011-12 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing requirement and concluding defendant could not establish adverse effect); United 
States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[A] reviewing court cannot reliably determine to 
what extent the decisions were based on legitimate tactical considerations and to what extent they were the 
result of impermissible consideration(s) . . . .”) (quoting United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 
512, 520 (3d Cir. 1979)); Skinner v. Duncan, 2003 WL 21386032 at * 44-*46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing 
assessment of adverse effect).  See also The Supreme Court, 2001 Term,supra note 25, at 247-50 
(discussing difficulty of establishing adverse effect); Joy, supra note 12, at 42 (noting challenges 
defendants face when trying to establish adverse impact). 
40 See United States v. Fuller, 312 F.3d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that trial record is rarely complete 
enough to support claim that counsel was ineffective); Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 
1994) (discussing need for hearing).  See also Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 872 (9th  Cir. 2006) 
(remanding for evidentiary hearing); Armienti v. United States, 234 F.3d 820, 825 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(remanding for evidentiary hearing in case where trial court denied petition without hearing two and a half 
years after it was filed); Briguglio v. United States, 675 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1982) (remanding for hearing); 
Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing whether defendant was entitled to 
evidentiary hearing); State v. Chandler, 698 S.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Mo. 1985) (describing hearing).  
41 See, e.g., Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 810 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that trial court credited 
testimony of counsel and the prosecutor and therefore rejected defendant’s claim).  In some cases, so much 
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The courts’ approach to conflicts of interest suffers from an additional 
shortcoming.  The courts generally focus narrowly on counsel’s conduct and do not factor 
in the likelihood that the prosecution’s actions are negatively influenced by defense 
counsel’s criminal problems or employment relation.  If the prosecutor views defense 
counsel either as a criminal or as an employee, the prosecutor may make discretionary 
decisions that disfavor the defendant by taking steps adverse to the defendant or 
refraining from actions that could benefit the defendant.42  A more protective approach 
would consider the impact on the prosecutor when evaluating whether counsel’s conflict 
had a detrimental effect on the representation of the defendant.   
 
Conflicts in each of the two categories on which this article focuses are highly 
likely to impact counsel’s representation in ways that cause subtle prejudice to the 
defendant, yet that prejudice will be extremely difficult to prove.  These categories of 
conflicts should therefore be analyzed under the Sullivan rule, granting the defendant 
relief on a showing of actual conflict and adverse effect.  However, given the difficulty of 
satisfying Sullivan, the defendant will not generally be able to obtain relief after the fact.  
Even when the defendant can point to specific omissions of counsel, the court will not 
readily view the omissions as a result of counsel’s self-interest flowing from counsel’s 
own criminal case or employment relationship with the prosecutor’s office.43  Only a per 
                                                                                                                                                 
time has passed that one must question the ability of those involved to recall what motivated specific 
actions.  See, e.g., Armienti v. United States, 234 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2000) (remanding for hearing three 
and a half years after petition was filed and seven years after conviction). 
42 See Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 583 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the accusation against defense 
counsel likely diminished the prosecution’s willingness to deal with defendant, but instead emphasizing 
that counsel could not pursue a plea bargain for the defendant because it might implicate counsel himself).  
For example, the prosecutor may opt for more limited discovery, performing to the letter of the rule but 
giving nothing more, not wishing to open the file to an attorney accused of criminal conduct.  Similarly, the 
prosecutor may refrain from offering a favorable plea bargain to the defendant or may offer a less favorable 
bargain than would otherwise be the case.  Of course, the defendant may have difficulty establishing such 
an effect.  See, e.g., Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 2002) (reporting that the 
prosecutor testified that her decisions were not influenced by the fact that defense counsel was the target of 
an ongoing grand jury investigation).   
43 See, e.g., Covey v. United States, 377 F.3d 903, 908-09 (8th Cir. 2004) (rejecting defendant’s argument 
that conflict of interest led to adverse effect); Skinner v. Duncan, 2003 WL 21386032 at * 46 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (rejecting argument that counsel’s omissions resulted from conflict of interest).  In some cases, the 
defendant can garner evidence that persuades the court that the most likely explanation for counsel’s 
shortcomings is the conflict of interest.  In Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 1994), for 
example, the defendant presented affidavits from the other lawyers on the defense team attesting to 
counsel’s conduct as a member of the team and describing the conflicted counsel’s efforts to direct their 
actions as well as his failure to perform tasks assigned to him. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, if the 
defendant established a conflict, the conduct described would satisfy the adverse effect requirement. 22 
F.3d at 773.  If counsel had not been part of a larger defense team, the defendant would have had to rely 
entirely on counsel’s self-serving assessment of his actions.  22 F.3d at 773.  See also United States v. 
McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that counsel’s conflict had led him to allow 
defendant’s trial to drag on and to fail to press for a negotiated plea); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 
157-58 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that counsel’s numerous conflicts explained the failure to adopt what the 
prosecution had referred to as defendant’s best defense); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 582 (9th Cir. 
1988) (pointing both to objective indication in record and to counsel’s admission that he was “shaken and 
furious” while cross-examining government witness who accused him of criminal conduct); Rugiero v. 
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se rule of reversal – protection granted by some states but most unlikely to be adopted as 
a matter of federal law – would fully protect the defendant.  As a result, early preventive 
intervention is critical to protect the defendant from possible severe repercussions of 
these conflicts and to maintain the fairness of the process. 
 
The balance of the Article discusses two specific types of conflicts, the 
importance of early intervention, and the resulting need to impose an ethical duty on the 
prosecutor to disclose facts pertinent to conflicts of these two types.  Section III explores 
the advantages of early intervention, offering better protection to the defendant as well as 
to the public interest.  Section IV discusses conflicts that arise because defense counsel 
has an employment relationship with the prosecutor’s office.  Section V discusses 
conflicts when defense counsel faces criminal charges or is under investigation for 
criminal wrong-doing.  Finally, Section VI argues for imposing on prosecutors a duty to 
disclose relevant information when defense counsel has employment relationship with the 
prosecutor’s office or a criminal problem.  
 
 III.  Early Intervention 
 
Because the attorney’s situation can compromise the fairness of the proceeding 
and yet not provide a basis for reversing the conviction, legal mechanisms must foster 
early intervention.  After the fact, it is extremely difficult to determine the effect of the 
conflict.44  The justice system will function more fairly if the court is able to confront 
possible conflicts early in the case and determine whether there is a substantial risk that 
the lawyer’s own interest or duty to another would materially and adversely affect the 
lawyer’s representation of the defendant.45  In the early stages of the case, the court has 
several options: it can (1) assess the situation and decide there is no actual or potential 
conflict and, hence, no problem,46 (2) accept a waiver from the defendant, or (3) 
disqualify counsel.   
 
 By addressing the issue early, the court may avoid the problems posed by 
counsel’s situation.  Early intervention by the court gives the defendant the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                                 
United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907-09 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (concluding that counsel was adversely 
affected in four specific ways). 
44 In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978), the Court noted the difficulty of proving 
prejudice in conflict cases: 
But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it bears repeating-is in 
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also 
as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible 
in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure 
to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available 
it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's 
representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the 
attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually 
impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike 
most cases, unguided speculation. 
45 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 121; Joy, supra note 12,at 41. 
46 See, e.g., Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2008) (trial court held hearing on alleged 
conflict and rejected defendant’s request for relief). 
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make an informed decision.  If the defendant elects to proceed with counsel despite the 
threatened conflict, the defendant will do so with open eyes.  In addition, discussion of 
the issues may encourage defense counsel to assess the ethical risks carefully, prompting 
a more complete discussion with the defendant or perhaps a request to withdraw from the 
case.  Further, early intervention permits the prosecution and defense counsel to discuss 
the possible conflict on the record, giving the court the best available assessment of the 
situation.47  If the court either accepts a valid waiver of the conflict from the defendant or 
removes counsel from the case after proper consideration of the defendant’s preference, 
the fairness of the process will be preserved and the conviction and sentence will be 
better insulated from challenge.   
 
A.  Waiver of the Conflict 
 
One reason to seek early and open disclosure of defense counsel’s predicament is 
to require the defendant to respond on the record.  Like concurrent representation of co-
defendants, these types of conflicts can be waived.48  The defendant may prefer to 
continue with counsel, regardless of the existence of counsel’s own criminal charges or 
counsel’s employment relation with the government.49  If so, the defendant may act on 
this preference and seek to waive the right to conflict-free counsel.  In turn, if the 
defendant waives the conflict on the record, the prosecution will be in a stronger position 
to defend any eventual conviction in the case.  
 
The trial court should evaluate the proffered waiver in the context of the specific 
case.  Due to the numerous factors that go into assessing the validity of a waiver, the 
courts should not establish a rule that these conflicts are categorically non-waivable.  
However, there are some cases in which the court may properly refuse to accept the 
defendant’s waiver.50  The court’s concern with the appearance of impropriety, ethical 
                                                 
47 Of course, any pretrial discussion of the possible conflict will lack all the facts.  In Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), the Court emphasized the challenge posed when the trial court must assess a 
conflict before trial.  486 U.S. at 162-63.  That said, the court cannot be expected to detail every possible 
problem raised by the conflict.  For example, if counsel is under investigation, neither the court nor the 
defendant will have access to the details of the government’s case against the attorney.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that defendant had sufficient information 
to make a valid waiver even though defendant did not know details of case against counsel).  For further 
discussion on the importance of early intervention, see infra notes 187-214 and accompanying text. 
48 United States v. Levine, 794 F.2d 1203, 1206 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding defendant had waived conflict free 
representation and could not then complain).  See also People v. Waddell, 24 P.3d 3, 8-11 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that defendant had effectively waived conflict when defense counsel was also under 
prosecution by same district attorney); Bridges v. United States, 784 F.2d 1189, 1992-94 (7th. Cir. 1986) 
(holding defendant waived the right to conflict free counsel since defendant knew about defense counsel’s 
possible conflict problems because both defendant and defense counsel were involved together in the 
cocaine-related transactions for which defendant was being charged). 
49 In some cases, the defendant is willing to waive some other right in order to resolve the conflict.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 1994) (defendant was willing to forgo the right to 
testify to prevent the prosecution from calling counsel as a witness and thereby permit counsel to continue 
in the case).   For a further discussion of waiving conflicts, see infra notes 51-66 and 223. 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that defendant could not 
waive the problem); United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1983) (agreeing with trial court 
that “likelihood of public suspicion outweigh[ed] the social interest served by [counsels] continued 
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standards, and unfairness if counsel continues in the case may persuade the court not to 
accept the defendant’s proffered waiver.51  While the court must give adequate 
consideration to the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of choice, the right is not 
absolute.52  The trial court’s obligation to oversee the fairness of the process and protect 
the integrity of the justice system will sometimes justify denying a defendant counsel of 
choice.53   
 
The court may also fear a later challenge based on counsel’s conflict.  If the court 
accepts the defendant’s waiver and the defendant proceeds with conflicted counsel, the 
defendant may later argue that counsel’s particular conflict was a non-waivable 
problem.54  Even though the defendant’s post-conviction argument is unlikely to 
prevail,55 the trial court may anticipate that later challenge and exercise its discretion to 
head it off, declining to accept the waiver. 
 
If the court allows the representation to continue despite counsel’s conflict, the 
court must establish a valid waiver because the defendant’s constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel is at stake.  The court should not find a waiver unless the 
court first engages the defendant in a colloquy, explaining the nature of the problem and 
the defendant’s options.56  Responsibility for addressing the issue and obtaining the 
                                                                                                                                                 
representation of defendant”); United States v. Melo, 702 F. Supp. 939, 943 (D. Mass. 1988) (concluding 
that waiver could not cure problem presented by evidence relating to counsel).  See also Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (noting that the courts “have an independent interest in ensuring that 
criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings 
appear fair to all who observe them”).   
51 See cases cited supra n. 50. 
52 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (holding that trial court did not give 
adequate consideration to defendant’s right to counsel of choice); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 
159 (1988) (holding that trial court could deny defendant counsel of choice); United States v. Hobson, 672 
F.2d 825, 828-29 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding over dissent that trial court gave adequate consideration to 
defendant’s right).   
53 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-62 (1988); United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 146 
(5th Cir. 1983) (affirming despite defendant’s complaint that trial court improperly disqualified counsel of 
choice).  See generally Patrice McGuire Sabach, Note, Rethinking Unwaivable Conflicts of Interest After 
United States v. Schwarz and Mickens v. Taylor, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 92-101 (discussing 
interplay between waiver decisions and defendant’s right to counsel of choice).  Cf. Indiana v. Edwards, 
128 S.Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (recognizing concern with appearance of fairness as one basis on which trial 
court could decline marginally competent defendant’s request to proceed pro se).  For example, if the 
criminal case against counsel proceeds to the point where counsel is suspended from practice, the court 
may take the position that counsel cannot properly represent anyone before the court and decline the 
waiver.  See United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 141-44 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that counsel suspended from practice before the district court should not be permitted to 
represent defendant on appeal to the circuit court of appeals). 
54 United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 612-14 (2d Cir. 1993).  See also United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 
132, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., dissenting) (concluding that counsel’s post-guilty plea suspension 
from practice before the district court could not be waived by defendant); Sabach, supra note 53, at 101-06 
(discussing and criticizing unwaivable conflicts). 
55   For further discussion on courts’ hesitation to apply a rule of per se reversal see infra notes 87-88, 118-
120 and accompanying text.  See generally Sabach, supra note 53, at 106-08 (noting that Second Circuit 
limits the class of unwaivable conflicts to those which represent per se constitutional violations). 
56 See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 n.4 (2d Cir. 1994) (summarizing steps court should take to 
obtain waiver).  See also Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1988) (conversation with counsel 
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waiver should not be left to counsel. 57  Although the Rules of Professional Responsibility 
direct counsel to explain the conflict to the client and obtain the client’s consent,58 
counsel’s private conversation with the defendant may not serve adequately to explore 
the possible conflict.59  Moreover, the defendant’s mere knowledge of counsel’s situation 
does not translate into a waiver.60  In the absence of a careful colloquy by the court, the 
defendant may not understand the issue and has no one other than the conflicted attorney 
from whom to seek advice.61  Only a full colloquy by the court will convey to the 
defendant the risks inherent in the conflict.   
                                                                                                                                                 
not sufficient to establish waiver; waiver must appear on the record); People v. Edebohls, 944 P.2d 552, 
557-58 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that trial court’s colloquy was inadequate where court did not determine 
whether defense counsel and defendant had discussed the conflict of interest, did not explain the conflict, 
and did not advise defendant of his right to conflict-free representation, and defendant responded 
equivocally to the court’s questions); State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550, 563 (N.J. 2008) (rejecting argument 
that waiver could be presumed and holding that valid waiver requires colloquy in court).  The court may 
also insist on an assurance from counsel that the situation will not compromise her representation of the 
defendant.  See, e.g., State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550, 563 (N.J. 2008) (requiring that counsel who also served 
as prosecutor “aver that despite the conflict [between counsel’s interest and the defendant’s] he ‘reasonably 
believes that [he] will be able to provide competent and diligent representation”).   
57 United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 158 (2d Cir. 1994) (cautioning against leaving the responsibility in 
the hands of the conflicted attorney); United States v. White, 706 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983) (criticizing 
court’s reliance on conflicted counsel); Phillips v. Warden, 595 A.2d 1356, 1364 n.12 (Conn. 1991) 
(describing counsel’s inadequate discussion of his situation with defendant).  The courts may assume that 
counsel will be forthright with the client, but the courts should not rely exclusively on the accuracy of that 
assumption. United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 62 (7th Cir. 1992).  See Bruce A. Green, Her Brother’s 
Keeper: The Prosecutor’s Responsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 339-40 (discussing failure of defense counsel to take appropriate steps). 
58 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7.  Rule 1.7(b)(4) gives requirements of informed 
consent in writing.  The lawyer must have “communicated adequate information and explanation about the 
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”  MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.0 (e). The client may revoke consent at any time.  
59 Commonwealth v. Agbanyo, 872 N.E.2d 758, 761 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (reflecting that in 
conversation with defendant, attorney did not explain nature of conflict).  But see People v. Waddell, 24 
P.3d 3, 6 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (relying primarily on conversation between counsel and defendant to 
satisfy waiver requirement). 
60 In some instances, where the defendant was aware of counsel’s criminal charges or dual role, the 
prosecution later argues that the defendant waived the conflict by proceeding with counsel even though 
aware of the problem.  In those situations, no waiver should be found.  See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 25 
F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that valid waiver did not exist when conflicted attorney informed 
defendant about his conflicts and the court failed to explain to defendant the defense counsel’s conflicts nor 
provide adequate time to defendant to reflect on decision to waive); United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 
631 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that valid waiver cannot be obtained if a government witness implicates the 
defense counsel in a crime related to the one which the defendant is being charged); United States v. 
Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 889 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a knowing and intelligent waiver of conflict free 
counsel did not exist since defendants were not given adequate time to contemplate risks associated with 
retaining conflicted counsel).  But see Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding defendant was not entitled to relief where defendant was fully aware of counsel’s criminal 
involvement).  
61 See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 151-52, 158 (2d Cir. 1994) (when the defendant 
complained about his lawyer, he was unclear how to respond to the court’s query as to whether he was 
moving to disqualify counsel; yet, when the conflict issues were raised post-conviction, the court concluded 
that the defendant had waived the issues); United States v. White, 706 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that 
court failed to inform defendant of risks flowing from counsel’s conflict); United States ex rel. Stewart v. 
Scott, 501 F. Supp. 53, 57-58 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (rejecting argument that defendant waived conflict where he 
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The court’s colloquy should be thorough.  Even when the issue is raised in court, 
the ensuing colloquy is sometimes deficient.62  Beyond conveying information to the 
defendant, the court must ensure that the defendant understands the dangers posed by 
counsel’s conflict.63  Even if the defendant is aware of counsel’s personal criminal 
situation or employment relationship to the prosecution, the court should not assume that 
the defendant therefore understands how counsel’s situation may impact the defendant’s 
representation.64  In addition to explaining the risks that the conflict may pose to the 
defendant’s representation, the court should assure the defendant that changing lawyers 
would not derail the defense of the case.65Although the colloquy protects not only the 
defendant’s interest, but also the government’s interest in the finality of the conviction if 
the defendant continues with counsel.66 
                                                                                                                                                 
was aware of counsel’s involvement but was actively misled by counsel); State v. Chandler, 698 S.W.2d 
844, 847 (Mo. 1985) (concluding that defendant’s partial awareness of conflict situation did not give rise to 
waiver); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 394 A.2d 965, 968 (Pa. 1978) (noting that defendant’s awareness of 
counsel’s possible criminal behavior was not sufficient to apprise defendant of counsel’s interest and the 
possible effect on counsel’s judgment).  See also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988) 
(remarking that “the willingness of an attorney to obtain [waivers of conflict] from his clients may bear an 
inverse relation to the care with which he conveys all the necessary information to them”).  The court 
should ideally give the defendant time to consider the issue and perhaps seek advice from an un-conflicted 
source. See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 n.4 (2d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that court should give 
the defendant “time to digest and contemplate the risks after encouraging him or her to seek advice from 
independent counsel” before accepting a waiver); United States v. Levine, 794 F.2d 1203, 1205 (7th Cir. 
1986) (trial court offered defendant opportunity to consult with another lawyer before waiving conflict).  
See also People v. Edebohls, 944 P.2d 552, 557 (Colo. App. 1996) (suggesting that court could appoint 
temporary counsel to advise defendant).  But see United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 62-63 (7th  Cir. 
1992) (defendant does not have right to consult with outside counsel, and such consultation would have 
added little to the defendant’s decision to waive conflict-free representation). 
62 See People v. Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393, 397-98 (Ill. 1984) (holding that knowing and understanding 
waiver by defendant was absent because record does not show any explanation of conflict to defendant).  
See also Commonwealth v. Agbanyo, 872 N.E.2d 758, 762 n.5, 763 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (recounting 
colloquy and noting that its brevity makes it insufficient).  
63 United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888-889 (2d Cir. 1982) (recommending that the court address the 
defendant and invite narrative answers to gauge the defendant’s understanding). 
64 In Cerro v. United States, 872 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s 
conflict argument in part because:  
If Ewers [counsel] was involved in criminal activity, Cerro probably knew about it. If we 
accept the underlying premise of Cerro's argument, we must find that Ewers was actively 
involved in the same criminal conspiracy that Cerro headed according to the 
overwhelming testimony of Cerro's coconspirators. If this was the case, Cerro was clearly 
aware of the potential conflict well in advance of trial. Cerro's argument at this point is 
disingenuous and incongruous. He wants us to overturn his conviction because his 
attorney had previously been deeply involved in helping him run his criminal conspiracy. 
872 F.2d at 785 (citations omitted).  The public may not understand the waiver and still perceive 
the situation as unfair. 
65 United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his waiver 
was not valid because the trial date was close and counsel would not refund his fee); United States v. 
Levine, 794 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (7th Cir. 1986) (recounting court’s thorough colloquy).  The trial court 
should have explored these issues with the defendant at the time of the waiver discussion.   
66 See, e.g., United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1293 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to give weight to 
defendant’s “newly discovered alleged ‘hidden’ motivations for his decision to continue to retain his trial 
counsel”). 
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B. Disqualification of Counsel 
 
Alternatively, early consideration of counsel’s conflict may prompt the trial court to 
disqualify counsel.67  If defense counsel will be compromised by personal criminal 
difficulties or an employment relationship to the prosecutor’s office, both the actual and 
apparent fairness of the proceeding may best be protected by removing the challenged 
lawyer from the case.68   
 
  Of course, in deciding whether to disqualify defense counsel, the court must 
consider the defendant’s right to counsel of choice.69  Nevertheless, as the Court made 
clear in Wheat v. United States,70 the trial court may remove counsel if the court 
perceives a risk of serious conflict.  The trial court is not charged merely with protecting 
the defendant’s rights.  In some cases, the court may disqualify counsel to avoid 
unfairness to the government or harm to the government’s case.71  In other cases, the 
court may act based on its responsibility for ensuring that ethical standards are 
followed.72  The court may also discharge counsel to protect the actual and apparent 
                                                 
67 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988) (upholding trial court’s pretrial disqualification 
of counsel and emphasizing trial court’s authority to decline to accept defendant’s proffered waiver); In re 
Goodman, 210 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex. App. 2006) (issuing writ of mandamus disqualifying prosecutor who 
previously represented defendant), rev'd sub nom. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist., 236 S.W.3d 
207, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  If the defendant objects, the defendant can bring an interlocutory appeal.  
United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 826-27 (11th Cir. 1982).  
68 This solution may also assist in similar situations where the prosecutor previously represented the 
defendant. 
69 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (concluding that trial court violated 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 
(1988) (holding the trial court did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice by 
disqualifying counsel); see also United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820, 828 (11th Cir. 1999) (the 
defendant argued that the trial court violated his sixth amendment right by disqualifying his attorney where 
the prosecution suggested that there was evidence that his attorney was involved in criminal activity).  In 
United States v. Hoffman, 926 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Tenn. 1996), the court explained the challenge for the 
court when defense counsel faces a conflict of interest: 
Courts have competing concerns in the context of potential conflicts of interest for 
retained counsel.  On the one hand, the right to conflict-free representation requires 
courts to investigate potential conflicts of interest and determine if a defendant has 
sufficient information to decide to waive this right and continue with potentially 
conflicted counsel.  On the other hand, the right to retain counsel of one's choice dictates 
that a court does not have a free hand to remove retained counsel when the defendant 
expresses a desire that potentially conflicted counsel should continue.  It is not the place 
of the court to substitute its own judgment that it is unwise to continue to retain counsel 
in the presence of a conflict of interest.  Once the defendant has expressed the desire to 
keep his counsel despite a conflict of interest, the court can not attempt to change the 
defendant's mind. 
926 F. Supp. at 669 n.16. 
70 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
71 See Green, supra note 57, at357-58 (discussing risk that counsel who was accused of crime by 
government witness might be perceived by jury as having special knowledge of the facts, to the detriment 
of the prosecution’s case and also suggesting that in rare cases the government might need to call counsel 
as a witness). 
72 486 U.S. at 160-61. 
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fairness of the proceeding.73  The appearance of propriety is particularly important in 
criminal cases.74  The courts must strive to assure that the public perceives the justice 
system as fair and its outcomes as legitimate.75 
 
 
 IV.  Defense Counsel with Employment Relation to Prosecutor’s Office 
 
Defense counsel in a criminal case who also serves as a prosecutor, who obtains 
employment as a prosecutor while representing the defendant, or who moves to the 
prosecutor’s office while the defendant’s case is ongoing faces a likely conflict of 
interest.76  A defendant who discovers that defense counsel is also employed as a 
                                                 
73 486 U.S. at 160-61.  See also State v. Loyal, 753 A.2d 1073, 1088 (N.J. 2000) (emphasizing that trial 
court declared mistrial after learning of counsel’s conflict to assure fairness of trial, not to avoid appearance 
of impropriety). 
74 See generally Roberta K. Flowers, What You See is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Propriety 
Stands to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV.  699 (1998) (discussing history of Appearance of Impropriety 
Standard); see also Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil 
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593 (1992) (discussing standard).  This article does not suggest the adoption 
of a formal standard, but merely argues that the appearance of impropriety should be a factor in 
determining when to disqualify counsel and that the importance of the issue warrants imposing a disclosure 
obligation on the prosecution.  The inclusion of language in rules of professional responsibility prohibiting 
the appearance of impropriety has been criticized as too vague to provide an adequate standard.  See, e.g., 
Kathleen Maher, Keeping Up Appearances, 16 PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (2005) (discussing history of 
standard) 
75 See generally Flowers, supra note 74, at 728-32 (1998) (arguing that public perception of fairness of 
justice system is critical). 
76 One cannot discuss the issues raised when defense counsel becomes a prosecutor without considering the 
military model, where such movement from defense to prosecution has traditional been common.  By 
statute, military counsel cannot serve two disparate functions in the same case.  10 U.S.C.A. § 827(a) 
provides: 
(1) Trial counsel and defense counsel shall be detailed for each general and special court-
martial. Assistant trial counsel and assistant and associate defense counsel may be 
detailed for each general and special court-martial. The Secretary concerned shall 
prescribe regulations providing for the manner in which counsel are detailed for such 
courts-martial and for the persons who are authorized to detail counsel for such courts-
martial. 
(2) No person who has acted as investigating officer, military judge, or court member in 
any case may act later as trial counsel, assistant trial counsel, or, unless expressly 
requested by the accused, as defense counsel or assistant or associate defense counsel in 
the same case. No person who has acted for the prosecution may act later in the same 
case for the defense, nor may any person who has acted for the defense act later in the 
same case for the prosecution. 
Of course, the defendant can waive the protection.  See United States v. Sparks, 29 M.J. 52 (United States 
Court of Military Appeals 1989).  See generally Kwasi L. Hawks, Whose Side Are You On? Conflict, 
Argument, and Disqualification in Last Year's Court Term 2009 ARMY LAWYER 64 (2009) (discussing 
conflicts in military cases); Nancy Higgins, USALSA Report: Trial Defense Service Note: Avoiding 
Conflicts of Interest in Trial Defense Practice, 1990 ARMY LAW. 24 (1990) (discussing avoidance of 
conflicts within military defense/prosecution structure).  Even within this established structure, the courts 
recognize the hazard to the defendant when defense counsel does not respect the ethical limitations. United 
States v. Lee, 66 M.J. 387 (Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).  In Lee, defense counsel allegedly 
misinformed the defendant regarding counsel’s prosecution function.  Counsel told the defendant that he 
would be completing his defense duties and moving to prosecute minor offenses and assured the defendant 
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prosecutor or is moving from defense practice into the prosecutor’s office has good 
reason to question counsel’s undivided loyalty and effectiveness and the fairness of the 
proceedings.77  Likewise, the public may disrespect a justice system that permits counsel 
to represent both the state and the prosecuted.  This section of the article explores the 
implications of three different employment relationships.  Section A evaluates cases 
where defense counsel accepts a position with the prosecutor’s office while actively 
representing the defendant.  Section B considers instances in which defense counsel 
simultaneously serves as a prosecutor.  Section C discusses cases in which an attorney 
who previously worked in the prosecutor’s office steps into the role of defense counsel.  
Section D assesses the issues related to early intervention in these cases.  
 
A.  Defense Counsel Who Obtains Employment in the Prosecutor’s Office 
 
In some cases, defense counsel accepts employment with the prosecutor’s office 
before the defendant’s case is resolved.78  Once defense counsel accepts a position with 
the prosecutor’s office, a serious question arises as to whether counsel should continue to 
litigate cases against that office.79  The change in sides creates an appearance of 
impropriety as well as the risk of an actual conflict.   
 
Where the former defense counsel enters into an employment relationship with a 
prosecutor’s office, counsel is not ethically precluded from representing the government 
in future criminal cases against a former client.80  Nevertheless, counsel is subject to 
                                                                                                                                                 
there was no conflict.  66 M.J. at 388.  In fact, the defendant alleged that while representing the defendant 
counsel was actively prosecuting a serious case under the supervision of the lawyer prosecuting the 
defendant.  66 M.J. at 388.  See generally Hawks, supra, at 65-67 (2009) (discussing Lee). 
77 See, e.g., Fenner v. Berghuis 2006 WL 374171 at *12-14 (W.D. Mich. 2006); Reeves v. State, 497 
S.E.2d 625 (Ga. App. 1998) (granting reversal where counsel accepted position with prosecutor’s office 
shortly before defendant’s trial began).  Occasional cases arise in which counsel simultaneously represents 
the defendant and the prosecutor.  In such cases, a clear conflict exists.  See, e.g., People v. Castro, 657 
P.2d 932, 943-45 (Colo. 1983) (holding that simultaneous representation of defendant and district attorney 
created conflict of interest).  Such cases are beyond the scope of this article. 
78 See, e.g., Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2008).  A preliminary question is whether even 
seeking employment in the office prosecuting the defendant creates a conflict of interest.  The courts tend 
to conclude it does not.  See, e.g., United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1420 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting 
argument that counsel who was finalist for position of United States Attorney suffered from conflict of 
interest that violated defendant’s rights, characterizing the risk of conflict as too fanciful); People v. Clark, 
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 717-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (no conflict where counsel was campaigning to be 
elected district attorney while representing the defendant). While counsel may have some incentive to 
ingratiate herself to those in the prosecutor’s office, the situation is not viewed as raising the divided 
loyalty that characterizes conflicts of interest.  However, The Law Governing Lawyers discusses the 
example of an attorney who seeks employment with opposing party or law firm and identifies this as a 
conflict regardless of who initiates the discussions.  See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 
Third, Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 125 pp. 314-15 (2000). 
79 See Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 872-73 (8th Cir. 1999) (recognizing problem when counsel representing 
defendant has accepted and is about to assume a position in the prosecutor’s office).   
80 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (comment) provides guidance: 
When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent 
representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly 
is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for 
a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually 
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ethical restrictions.  These restrictions both prohibit counsel from using confidential 
information obtained from the former client and limit counsel’s representation of the 
government in a matter in which the interests are adverse to the former client.81  The 
critical ethical question is whether counsel’s role as a prosecutor will lead to a breach of 
confidence or improper adverse representation.   
 
The ethical rules set the bar too low.  Even if counsel appears to be within the 
boundaries set by the ethical rules, the change in sides creates both an appearance of 
unfairness and the risk that former counsel will exploit client confidences.  If counsel will 
have any contact with the prosecution of the former client, the risk of impropriety is 
great.  Because the prosecutor controls a range of discretionary decisions in every 
criminal case, the prosecutor is likely, consciously or not, to call on prior knowledge of 
the defendant to inform these decisions.82   
 
When counsel actually moves to the prosecutor’s office before the defendant’s 
case is resolved, both the risk of conflict and the apparent unfairness increase. The 
defendant may understandably – even justifiably - fear that counsel will share privileged 
information with the prosecution.83  In such a case, the prosecutor’s office must take steps 
to create a barrier between the former defense counsel and the defendant’s case, ensuring 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a 
position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment 
of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military 
jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the 
matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in 
the matter in question. 
81 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 governs duties to former clients.  The rule provides: 
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that 
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.  
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously 
represented a client  
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and  
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(c) that is material to the matter;  
unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.  
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former 
firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:  
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the 
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a 
client, or when the information has become generally known; or  
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would 
permit or require with respect to a client.  
82 See WAYNE LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 13.1-13.4 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing prosecutorial 
discretion). 
83 Fenner v. Berghuis 2006 WL 374171 at *14 (W.D. Mich. 2006).  See also People v. Gaines, 716 
N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (concluding that defendant should not have to rely on good faith 
of former counsel who was employed by prosecutor’s office by time defendant pleaded guilty). 
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that no client confidences leak through to the prosecution.84  Only if counsel can be 
entirely cordoned off from the defendant’s case, does the risk of breach disappear.85  
However, even if the office establishes an effective barrier, the defendant and the public 
are likely to perceive the system as unfair if the defendant’s counsel now works for the 
other side.86   
 
Nevertheless, the courts will not generally apply a per se rule granting the 
defendant relief. 87  They do not see a conflict of interest when counsel merely accepts 
employment in the prosecutor’s office while continuing to represent the defendant.88  
Further, it will be difficult for the defendant to find evidence of improper communication 
between the prosecutors working on the defendant’s case and the defendant’s prior 
counsel.89  In Commonwealth v. Agbanyo,90 for example, counsel informed the defendant 
on the morning of his trial that she had accepted a position with the county prosecutor’s 
office.  The defendant, unclear of his options, continued through trial with the same 
attorney.  After conviction, the defendant’s conflict claim was not strong because counsel 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., People v. Shinkle, 415 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. 1980) (when former defense counsel joined 
prosecutor’s office, “conflict” stickers were placed on all pending cases in which counsel’s office had 
represented a defendant, and counsel was to have no interaction with those cases or the prosecutors 
handling them).  Cf. Paul R. Tremblay, Migrating Lawyers and the Ethics of Conflict Checking, 19 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 489 (2006) (discussing steps necessary when lawyers move between firms in private 
practice). 
85 This will depend on the structure of the prosecutor’s office. In a smaller office, it will be more difficult to 
create a clear barrier between the defendant’s lawyer and the defendant’s case.  Even some large offices are 
quite collaborative, giving wide access to files and sharing information, making it difficult to assure client 
confidences will be respected. 
86 People v. Shinkle, 415 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. 1980) (“In defendant’s perception it was his former 
attorney who was personally championing the People’s cause against him.”).  See also Paul B. Spelman, 
Recent Decisions: A Public Prosecutor and the Appearance of Justice, 65 MD. L. REV. 1222, 1245-53 
(2006) (arguing that prosecutor should be disqualified from prosecuting defendant whom he previously 
represented). 
87 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 195 S.W.3d 23, 27 (Mo. App. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s post-conviction 
challenge based on fact that prosecutor had represented her when serving a public defendant); People v. 
English, 665 N.E.2d 1056, 1057 (N.Y. 1996) (concluding that there was no per se rule requiring reversal 
and that defendant was not entitled to relief on collateral review unless he alleged and established 
prejudice). 
88 See Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1198-1199 (9th Cir.1994) (counsel’s upcoming employment in 
district attorney’s office did not create conflict); People v. Martinez, 98 Cal. Rptr. 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 
(actual conflict did not result from counsel’s acceptance of position with prosecutor’s office); Catala v. 
State, 897 A.2d 257, 269 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that counsel’s 
upcoming position with State’s Attorney created conflict of interest); People v. Doggett, 625 N.E.2d 923, 
927-28 (Ill. 1993) (counsel’s upcoming employment in prosecutor’s office did not create conflict).  But see 
Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that trial court did not make proper inquiry 
when it learned that counsel had accepted employment with the prosecutor’s office); People v. Marshall, 
242 Cal. Rptr. 319, 321-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting defendant’s argument that counsel had labored 
under a conflict because he had accepted a job with the prosecutor’s office before representing the 
defendant).   
89 See People v. Shinkle, 415 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. 1980) (suggesting that such evidence is likely to be 
“out of defendant’s reach”); Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 309-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (discussing 
evidence contrary to defendant’s claim of conflict).   
90 872 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
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had never simultaneously served both the defendant and the government.91  The court 
acknowledged a possible effect of the impending employment: that counsel would pull 
her punches for fear that her future colleagues, including the law enforcement officers 
with whom she would have to work, would be offended if she defended vigorously.  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that these effects were too speculative to warrant 
relief.92   
 
B.  Counsel also Serving as a Prosecutor 
 
In some jurisdictions, prosecution functions are performed by private counsel 
working part-time for the government.93  This institutional arrangement creates the 
likelihood that some defense counsel, retained or appointed, will also work part time as 
prosecutors.94  Defendants may therefore be represented by counsel who has dual roles.  
In these cases, there is a risk of conflict as well as a threat to the appearance of fairness.95  
Such institutional arrangements should be avoided, and counsel should be precluded from 
serving as both a prosecutor and a criminal defense attorney.96 
 
 A conflict appears to exist in these cases because counsel owes the defendant a 
duty of zealous representation and also owes a duty of loyalty to the state.97  Some states 
                                                 
91 Commonwealth v. Agbanyo, 872 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (stating counsel was “never in 
the position of owing conflicting professional duties to the defendant and to the district attorney's office”). 
92 Commonwealth v. Agbanyo, 872 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).  In its discussion, the court did 
not focus on the appearance of unfairness created by the circumstances of the case.   
93 See generally Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and 
Some Proposals, 81 KY. L.J. 1, 10-13 (1993) (describing practice in Kentucky); see Susan W. Brenner and 
James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 
419-20 (1993) (discussing states’ use of part-time prosecutors). 
94 See Underwood, supra note 93, at 5 (noting that a large number of ethics questions are posed by part-
time prosecutors). 
95 See, e.g., State v. Almanza, 910 P.2d 934, 935 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (finding disqualifying conflict 
where counsel was assigned to represent the defendant because his law firm had a contract with the public 
defender and law firm also represented the municipality, prosecuting cases for the city); People v. 
Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. 1984) (concluding that trial court committed error when it denied 
counsel’s motion to withdraw after counsel discovered that his firm was prosecuting defendant for traffic 
offenses in municipal court).  In Almanza, the court concluded that “the problem of divided loyalties is so 
significant in this case that only necessity or compelling public policy could justify continued 
representation absent waiver by the client.”  910 P.2d at 935.  See generally Underwood, supra note 93, at 
18-20 (discussing concern with appearance of impropriety). 
96 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 3-1.3 (3d ed. 1993) 
(stating that a prosecutor should not serve as defense counsel in the jurisdiction in which he or she serves as 
a prosecutor).  Enforcement of such a rule would have some impact on the ability of governmental units to 
hire part-time prosecutors and to appoint defense counsel.  See generally Underwood, supra note 93, at 6-9 
(criticizing use of part-time prosecutors).  A number of states restrict the freedom of part-time prosecutors 
to serve as criminal defense attorneys.  See generally Richard H. Underwood, supra note 93, at 37-39 
(discussing examples).  See State v. Clark, 744 A.2d 109, 112 (N.J. 2000) (noting that new rule restricting 
freedom of municipal prosecutors to represent criminal defendants would “likely lead to some resignations 
by municipal prosecutors”) (overruled on other grounds in State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425 (N.J. 2002)).  There 
is no reason to suppose, however, that sufficient attorneys would not be available to fill all the positions 
without generating a conflict of interest. 
97 See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857-58 (Utah 1992) (noting conflicts between the two roles).  The 
Comment to the Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility states: 
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have therefore taken the position that public policy restricts the extent to which a public 
prosecutor may also serve as a defense attorney.98  A number of factors support this 
position.  First, counsel will face subtle pressure to accommodate the governmental unit 
when acting as prosecutor. 99  Second, the same law enforcement officers who serve as 
prosecution witnesses when counsel is prosecuting may testify against counsel’s client 
when counsel is defending.100  As a result, counsel may have to attack the credibility of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
[A]bsent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the 
lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated.  The 
client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the 
resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer’s ability 
to represent the client effectively.  In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse 
representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client’s 
case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may 
be materially limited by the lawyer’s interest in retaining the current client. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (comment). 
98 See, e.g., State v. Clark, 744 A.2d 109 (N.J. 2000) (holding that in future cases a municipal prosecutor is 
barred from serving as defense counsel in the same county) (overruled on other grounds in State v. Rue, 
811 A.2d 425 (N.J. 2002)); People v. Rhodes, 524 P.2d 363, 365-67 (Cal. 1974) (holding that prosecutors 
could not also serve as defense counsel); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857 (Utah 1992) (reversing 
conviction because defense counsel also served as part-time prosecutor and holding “that as a matter of 
public policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, as well as our express power 
to govern the practice of law, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to 
defend indigent persons”).  New Jersey already had a rule precluding municipal prosecutors from 
representing defendants in municipal court.  Clark, 744 A.2d at 110-11.  See Brenner, supra note 93, at 
425-32 (describing various positions states take on whether part-time prosecutors are allowed to engage in 
criminal defense). 
99 See State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 478 (Tenn. 2003) (concluding that counsel’s two roles created a 
conflict of interest because counsel could not simultaneously fulfill his duty to “vigorously prosecute cases 
on behalf of the State” on one hand and his duty to zealously represent the defendant on the other); State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 858 (Utah 1992) (noting the likelihood of subliminal influence on counsels 
representation of defendant).  The Illinois courts enforce a per se rule based in part on the subliminal, 
subtle, and subconscious pressure counsel may experience due to the conflict.  People v. Washington, 461 
N.E.2d 393, 397 (Ill. 1984).  The United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel has 
expressed the opinion that “it is considered unethical for an active prosecutor to represent criminal 
defendants in his or her own or another jurisdiction,” citing “‘subliminal or concealed’ influences on the 
attorney's loyalty.” 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 110, 112 (1977), cited in United States v. Lee, 66 M.J. 387, 
388 (Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). 
100 See State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 478 (Tenn. 2003) (noting that representing the defendant could 
require counsel to cross-examine law enforcement officers or to challenge the laws of the state). Moreover, 
there is a risk that this dynamic “will extend to examination of law enforcement officers from surrounding 
areas, whose cooperation is also often critical to enforcement of the local laws.”  People v. Rhodes, 524 
P.2d 363, 365, 367 (Cal. 1974).  The court noted that “there inevitably will arise a struggle between, on the 
one hand, counsel's obligation to represent his client to the best of his ability and, on the other hand, a 
public prosecutor's natural inclination not to anger the very individuals whose assistance he relies upon in 
carrying out his prosecutorial responsibilities.  Such a conflict of interest would operate to deprive a 
criminal defendant of the undivided loyalty of defense counsel to which he is entitled.”  ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1235 (1972), stating: 
Depending on whether a lawyer is cast in a defense or prosecutorial role, he may be 
required to frame and advocate interpretations of established rules of law or procedure 
that are, or seem to be, poles apart. He may be required to criticize police actions in one 
case, then turn about to defend the same or similar actions in a subsequent case where the 
facts may be, or seem to be, the same. He will deal frequently with the same investigative 
or police personnel; he may appear before the same [judges]. In the course of this, the 
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law enforcement officer whose credibility counsel vouches for when acting as a 
prosecutor. 101  This may prompt the attorney when acting as defense counsel to pursue a 
less vigorous cross-examination to preserve a good working relationship with the 
officers.102  Further, counsel may refrain from challenging or criticizing the conduct of 
law enforcement even though to do so could benefit the defense.  Third, if the defendant 
is aware of counsel’s employment as a prosecutor, the defendant may be reticent to 
confide appropriately in counsel.103  Fourth, the incompatibility of counsel’s dual roles 
could undermine public confidence in the integrity of the justice system.104  Finally, the 
public interest may suffer if counsel’s loyalty to the client interferes with counsel’s 
judgment or conduct as a prosecutor.105 
 
Nevertheless, such arrangements may not be clearly unethical,106 and not all 
courts see any conflict of interest in these situations.  Some jurisdictions permit the part-
                                                                                                                                                 
temptations may be great to mute the force of advocacy, or just the handling of cases in 
subtle ways. 
101 People v. Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393, 397 (Ill. 1984). 
102 State v. Clark, 744 A.2d 109, 111 (N.J. 2000) (overruled on other grounds in State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425 
(N.J. 2002)). 
103 State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 858 (Utah 1992) (recognizing the counsel’s dual employment would 
discourage defendant from confiding appropriately in counsel). 
104 People v. Rhodes, 524 P.2d 363, 365, 367 (Cal. 1974).  The court explained: 
[T]he nature and duties of a public prosecutor are inherently incompatible with the 
obligations of a criminal defense counsel. When a city attorney represents criminal 
defendants there arises the possibility that either the defendant's interest in a vigorous and 
determined advocacy or the public's interest in the smooth functioning of the criminal 
justice system will suffer. In addition, public confidence in the integrity of the criminal 
justice system could be adversely affected by the appearance of impropriety incident to a 
public prosecutor's private representation of a criminal defendant. Thus, the interests of 
both criminal defendants and the judicial system require that city attorneys who have 
prosecutorial responsibilities not represent criminal defendants.  
524 P.2d at 367 (citations omitted).  See also State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tenn. 2003) 
(emphasizing trial court’s responsibility for assuring the fairness of the proceedings and protecting against 
a later attack on the defendant’s waiver); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 858 (Utah 1992) (concluding that 
representation of defendant by attorney who also served as prosecutor created appearance of unfairness and 
could erode public confidence in the justice system). 
105 State v. Clark, 744 A.2d 109, 112 (N.J. 2000) (noting that dual role may undermine prosecutor’s 
impartiality) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to conviction but adopting rule precluding counsel from 
simultaneously serving as prosecutor and defense attorney in the same county in future cases) (overruled on 
other grounds in State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425 (N.J. 2002)). 
106 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest in relation to current 
clients and appears to leave room for such representation.  Rule 1.7 provides: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will 
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former 
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), 
a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
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time prosecutor to represent criminal defendants provided the cases are not in the same 
jurisdiction.107  But many of the factors discussed above threaten to compromise 
counsel’s representation even when the case is in a different jurisdiction.108 
 
Furthermore, even a court that recognizes the problematic nature of counsel’s dual 
role will not necessarily grant the defendant reversal on that basis.109  In Beaver v. 
Thompson,110 an attorney who served part time as a prosecutor in a neighboring county 
represented the defendant, who was charged with the capital offense of killing a state 
trooper.111  The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death, but later challenged 
his sentence on the ground that his attorney had been ineffective and had suffered from a 
conflict of interest.112  The state court explored counsel’s role and responsibilities as a 
prosecutor and found no cause for concern given the lack of connection between 
counsel’s work and the office prosecuting the defendant.  As a result, the courts 
concluded that counsel did not suffer from a conflict, despite the attorney’s testimony that 
he had a working relationship with the state troopers.113   
 
C. Counsel who Previously Worked in the Prosecutor’s Office 
  
There is clearly no broad prohibition against a lawyer who is a prosecutor leaving 
the office and representing defendants in criminal cases.114  However, a former 
prosecutor who participated in the development of a specific case against a defendant or 
appeared in court on the case cannot ethically represent the defendant in the criminal 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other 
proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Brenner, supra note 93, at 485-93 (discussing ethical challenges facing part-time prosecutors). 
107 Brenner, supra note 93, at 419-20 (discussing practice of permitting part-time prosecutors to represent 
defendants in other jurisdictions). 
108 Brenner, supra note 93, at 486-91 (discussing problem). 
109 See, e.g., State v. Clark, 744 A.2d 109 (N.J. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to conviction but 
adopting rule precluding counsel from simultaneously serving as prosecutor and defense attorney in the 
same county in future cases) (overruled on other grounds in State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425 (N.J. 2002)).  The 
court is particularly unlikely to see a conflict if counsel serves in different roles in different locales. State v. 
Gleason, 88 P.3d 218 (Kan. 2004) (finding no conflict where counsel served as prosecutor in adjoining 
county during first two months of his representation of defendant). 
110 93 F.3d 1186 (4th Cir. 1996). 
111 Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1192 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding counsel represented the county in a 
small number of criminal cases at the trial level and handled appeals for the county).   
He later became the county attorney.  Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1192 (4th Cir. 1996). 
112 Beaver v. Com., 352 S.E.2d 342, 351 (Va. 1987); Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1192 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
113 Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1193 (4th Cir. 1996).  The federal courts applied a deferential 
standard and concurred in the conclusion that there was no conflict.  Id. 
114 The prosecution may be adamant about disqualification because counsel’s prior involvement with the 
prosecution of the case may benefit the defendant.  See People v. Kester, 361 N.E.2d 569, 572 (Ill. 1977).  
Consideration of when the government would want to challenge counsel’s involvement in the case is 
beyond the scope of this article.  Generally, however, the defendant will not be concerned; no breach of 
confidence is threatened and counsel is not actively representing adverse interests. 
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case.115  Although the relevant rules principally protect the government’s interest, the 
defendant should also be protected from this improper representation.116  The potential 
for conflict and, perhaps more important, the appearance of unfairness are too great when 
the lawyer first represents the government in a case and then takes on the defense of the 
same case.  It cannot be clear where the lawyer’s loyalties lie.  Even if the defendant does 
not recall the earlier encounter with the attorney, the court should take steps to inform 
and protect the defendant.117   
  
D.  Early Intervention When Counsel Has an Employment Relation with the Prosecutor’s 
Office 
 
                                                 
115 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.9 and 1.11 address the obligations of a former 
prosecutor and restrict the former prosecutor’s freedom to provide defense representation. 
Rule 1.9 (c) provides: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former 
firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:  
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the 
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a 
client, or when the information has become generally known; or  
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would 
permit or require with respect to a client. 
Rule 1.11(a) provides 
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public 
officer or employee of the government:  
(1) is subject to Rule 1.9(c); and  
(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which 
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or 
employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, 
confirmed in writing, to the representation. 
116 See United States v. Clark, 333 F. Supp. 2d 789, 797 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (granting motion to disqualify 
defense counsel who had worked on case while in United States Attorney’s Office); Brown v. State, 568 
S.E.2d 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding trial court’s decision to disqualify former prosecutor proposed 
as substitute defense counsel, noting that trial court could do so to avoid even appearance of impropriety); 
People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1186-87 (Ill. 1994) (applying per se rule to reverse conviction where 
counsel first represented state in prosecution of defendant and then represented defendant in same case);  
People v. Kester, 361 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. 1977) (same); Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Ky. 
1999) (discussing the state rule governing successive government and private representation and holding 
associates of former prosecutor were also barred from representing defendant).  
117 See, e.g., People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1185-87 (Ill. 1994) (noting that record did not indicate 
that defendant was aware that counsel had previously served as prosecutor in the case, but holding that 
defendant was entitled to relief); People v. Kester, 361 N.E.2d 569, 570 (Ill. 1977) (reporting colloquy in 
which defendant failed to inform court that counsel handled case in prosecutor’s office even though court 
made pointed inquiry).  Even where counsel served as a prosecutor in a case against the defendant twenty 
years earlier, the Seventh Circuit found sufficient threat of actual conflict that an evidentiary hearing was 
required.  United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1989).  It is not clear, however, 
whether a public defender’s office headed by such a former prosecutor should be entirely disqualified from 
representing the defendant. See People v. Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30, 38 (Ill. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument that there was per se conflict that disqualified all public defenders where head of office was 
former prosecutor who had participated in decision to prosecute defendant).  See also HAZARD AND HODES, 
supra note 4, at 15-10 (noting that a conflict on the part of a single government lawyer does not generally 
disqualify the entire office). 
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Early intervention is critical in these cases.  While some state courts apply a rule 
of per se reversal,118 most courts do not.119  If the issue is not raised until after the 
defendant’s case is resolved, the defendant will face a difficult showing, either satisfying 
the Strickland test by showing specific instances of incompetence and proving prejudice 
or establishing the actual conflict and adverse affect required by Sullivan.  Either 
requirement is likely to be insurmountable.  Even when the defendant can point to 
specific omissions of counsel, the court will not readily view the omissions as flowing 
from counsel’s relationship with the prosecutor’s office.120  Yet, particularly when the 
                                                 
118 People v. Miller, 771 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ill. 2002) (finding per se conflict where former defense counsel 
represented state in later stages of same case); People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1183 (Ill. 1994) 
(explaining that per se rule rests in part on “unfairness to the accused, who could not determine whether his 
representation was affected, even subliminally, by the conflict”); People v. Waddell, 24 P.3d 3, 6 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2000) (adopting per se rule for certain cases).  In People v. Kester, 361 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. 1977), the 
Illinois Supreme Court explained why a per se rule was required: 
[T]here is also the possibility that the attorney might be subject to subtle influences which 
could be viewed as adversely affecting his ability to defend his client in an independent 
and vigorous manner.  It might be contended, for example, that the advice and 
performance of court-appointed counsel in such a situation was affected by a subliminal 
reluctance to attack pleadings or other actions and decisions by the prosecution which he 
may have been personally involved with or responsible for.  A defendant who has entered 
a plea of guilty might later suspect that his attorney's advice thereon had been influenced 
to some degree by a subconscious desire to avoid an adversary confrontation with the 
prosecution as a consequence of his previous participation in the case as the prosecuting 
attorney. . . . [I]t would be extremely difficult for an accused to show the extent to which 
this may have occurred.  At the same time, a lawyer who may have provided an able and 
vigorous defense with complete loyalty to the defendant is placed in the difficult and 
unfortunate position of being subject to unfounded charges of unfaithful representation.  
The untenable situation which results for both the accused and his court-appointed 
attorney in such instances is one which can and should be avoided in the interests of the 
sound administration of criminal justice. 
361 N.E.2d 569, 572 (citations omitted). 
119 See Catala v. State, 897 A.2d 257, 269 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (applying Sullivan test where counsel 
had accepted position with prosecutor’s office and concluding that defendant had failed to show either 
actual conflict or adverse effect); Commonwealth v. Agbanyo, 872 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 
(requiring defendant to show prejudice where counsel informed him on the morning of trial that she had 
accepted a position with the office prosecuting the case); Reeves v. State, 497 S.E.2d 625, 626 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1998) (declining to address per se rule, but granting defendant relief where counsel had accepted 
position with prosecutor’s office before trial); People v. English, 665 N.E.2d 1056, 1057 (N.Y. 1996) 
(concluding that there was no per se rule requiring reversal where counsel was removed from defendant’s 
case when he received employment in prosecutor’s office and did not then work in division that handled 
defendant’s case). 
120 Counsel is likely to testify against the defendant on the hearing to determine whether there was an actual 
conflict.  See, e.g., Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that trial court credited 
counsel’s testimony and consequently rejected defendant’s claim of conflict).  But see Blankenship v. 
Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that defendant established conflict of interest by 
establishing that counsel was employed by the prosecutor’s office at the time he represented defendant on 
appeal and that counsel did not take the steps necessary to protect defendant’s rights).  Some courts 
approach counsel’s testimony with skepticism.  The court has good reason to question the testimony of 
counsel at any later evidentiary hearing.  Counsel, now serving the government, has interests entirely 
aligned with the prosecution attempting to defend the conviction. See Reeves v. State, 497 S.E.2d 625, 626-
27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that counsel’s testimony at the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial 
was fatally conflicted because at that time counsel was employed by the prosecutor’s office and owed that 
office his duty of loyalty). 
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relationship between counsel and the prosecutor’s office is very close, a negative impact 
on counsel’s representation of the defendant is likely.  Moreover, if the case is allowed to 
proceed, the risk that counsel will breach the defendant’s confidence, providing protected 
information to the prosecution, increases, as does the likelihood of the appearance of a 
breach.  Delayed resolution of the conflict may thus create an irreconcilable situation in 
which the prosecutor’s office may have received client confidences and cannot fairly 
continue to handle the case against the defendant. 
 
Of course, in some cases the prosecution views the dual roles as a conflict and 
moves to disqualify counsel.121  But the government should not be permitted to raise the 
issue only when the prosecution’s interests are at stake.  The prosecution should be 
required to raise the issue even when it might prefer not to. 
 
To achieve early intervention, the prosecution as well as defense counsel should 
be charged with raising the possible conflict and bringing the issue to the court’s 
attention. 122 The defendant may not be aware of counsel’s other employment.  Even if 
the defendant was in court with the lawyer when the lawyer was representing the 
prosecution and, at a different time, when the lawyer was representing the defendant, the 
defendant may not understand the change in roles.123  The prosecutor’s office has ready 
access to the necessary information and should run a conflict check to determine whether 
defense counsel has an employment relationship with the prosecution that poses a 
problem.  States should maintain statewide databases including all current full or part 
time state, county, and municipal prosecutors, allowing the prosecution in each case to 
determine whether defense counsel is actively prosecuting cases in the state.124  Once a 
lawyer is hired as a prosecutor, the lawyer should be included in that database.   
 
When an employment relationship is called to the court’s attention, the court 
must, at the very least, carefully assess the relationship between defense counsel and the 
prosecutor’s office.125  The implications of counsel’s possible conflict will vary with the 
details of that relationship.  Where counsel concurrently holds or has accepted a position 
with the prosecutor’s office, the defendant should be informed and given the chance to 
                                                 
121 State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 479 (Tenn. 2003) (upholding trial court decision to grant the 
prosecution’s motion to disqualify defendant’s attorney, who also served as part time municipal and county 
prosecutor). 
122 Addressing the issue without involving the court does not adequately protect the defendant.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) (counsel discussed issue with prosecutor 
and defendant, but did not inform court of his prior representation of county against defendant). 
123 See People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1184-85 (Ill. 1994) (reporting that there was no evidence the 
defendant knew counsel had served on both sides of the case, even though the defendant was in court with 
counsel in each capacity).  Even substitute counsel may be unaware that defendant’s original lawyer was 
relieved of the assignment because of a relationship with the prosecutor’s office.  People v. English, 665 
N.E.2d 1056, 1057 (N.Y. 1996) (substitute counsel was not aware that defendant’s attorney had taken a job 
with the prosecutor’s office until well after defendant’s conviction).  
124 Cf. Robert W. Martin, Practicing Law in the 21st Century: Fundamentals for Avoiding Malpractice 
Liability, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 191 (discussing use of conflicts databases). 
125 See, e.g., State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 478-79 (Tenn. 2003) (evaluating structure of counsel’s role in 
prosecutor’s office and distinguishing case in which role as county attorney extended only to civil 
representation). 
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request a substitution of counsel.  Indeed, if the court discusses the question with the 
defendant before trial, the court should assure the defendant that she can proceed with a 
new, unconflicted lawyer.  Unless the court gives the defendant this assurance, any 
waiver of current counsel’s potential conflict should not be regarded as valid.126  Even if 
the court explains the full range of options to the defendant, the validity of the 
defendant’s waiver is suspect because the defendant may fear that severing the attorney-
client relationship will prompt counsel to share confidential information with the 
prosecution.  
 
 V.  Defense Counsel Facing or Under Investigation for Criminal Charges 
 
When counsel faces criminal investigation or charges, the problem is far stickier.  
A serious conflict arises when counsel is fighting for her own interest against the hostile 
force of the criminal justice system while, at the same time, representing the defendant.127  
An attorney who is under criminal investigation or charged with a crime invariably labors 
under divided loyalties.128  Not only will the pending charges or investigation pose a 
distraction to counsel, but counsel will feel pressure to take steps to improve her own 
situation even to the detriment of the defendant’s case.  The pressure on an attorney who 
is threatened with criminal liability is far more severe than that affecting an attorney 
                                                 
126 See Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 872 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that trial court did not make proper 
inquiry when it learned that counsel had accepted employment with the prosecutor’s office); People v. 
Marshall, 242 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting defendant’s argument that counsel had 
labored under a conflict because he had accepted a job with the prosecutor’s office before representing the 
defendant).   
127 An attorney faces a conflict of interest not only when the interests of two clients diverge, but also when 
the client’s interests conflict with the attorney’s self interest. See People v. Edebohls, 944 P.2d 552, 556 
(Colo. App. 1996) (citing COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)).  In United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 
605, 609 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit explained that “[a]situation in which the attorney’s own 
interests diverge from those of the client presents the same core problem presented in the multiple 
representation cases: the attorney’s fealty to the client is compromised.” As the Third Circuit pointed out in 
DeFalco, “apparently legitimate decisions are rendered suspect if made by counsel with conflicting 
loyalties.”  644 F.2d at 135.   
128 See Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that a conflict of interest exists 
where counsel has to choose between advancing personal interests and advancing interests of client); 
Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that when attorney is under criminal 
investigation he may be induced “to pull his punches in defending his client lest the prosecutor’s office be 
angered by an acquittal and retaliate against the lawyer.”); United States v. Lafuente, 2008 WL 3849903 
(N.D.Ill. 8/14/2008) (stating that actual conflict of interest exists where there is sufficient evidence that 
counsel faces criminal charges in same court as client); Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907 
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding attorney had actual conflict of interest that adversely affected representation 
where attorney faced criminal charges in same district as client). But see New Jersey v. Pych, 517 A.2d 
871, 875 (Super. Ct. NJ 1986) (stating that because attorney was indicted in different county and indictment 
was unlikely to compromise his professional reputation, there was no conflict of interest).  Counsel may 
also suffer from a conflict if counsel engaged in criminal conduct that has not yet come to the attention of 
the authorities.  As the Second Circuit pointed out in United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 
1984), “a wrong step by counsel in representing their clients might well have drawn unwanted attention to 
themselves.” 725 F.2d at 871.  Even if counsel’s criminal wrongdoing is not related to the defendant’s 
cases, counsel has a strong incentive to keep a low profile and stay on the prosecution’s good side. 
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whose self-interest lies in pursuit of a financial benefit or personal benefit.129  The 
attorney’s entire livelihood, reputation, and liberty are on the line.130   
 
Moreover, in addition to the possibility of actual unfairness, the appearance of 
unfairness is inescapable.131  Neither the defendant nor the public can be expected to 
understand a system that places the burden of advising the defendant and mounting the 
defense on an attorney who is simultaneously being pursued as a criminal. 
 
The gravity of the conflict will vary depending on several factors.  First, the 
relationship between the office prosecuting counsel’s case and the office prosecuting the 
defendant will affect the extent of the conflict.  Counsel’s pursuit of the defendant’s 
interest may be particularly strongly colored by counsel’s concern for her own defense 
when the prosecutor’s office is handling both counsel’s and defendant’s cases.  Second, 
the stage of the criminal investigation of counsel will affect the conflict.  If counsel 
knows the prosecution is seeking her indictment or if she is actively defending against 
criminal charges, the conflict may be more acute than if counsel is unaware that she is 
under investigation or if counsel’s case has largely been resolved.  Thus the precise 
timing of the investigation and charges may be critical to determining the extent to which 
counsel’s personal situation creates a conflict of interest.132  Section A examines the 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 935-41 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Sullivan to a situation 
where defense counsel was involved romantically with the prosecutor); Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265-
66 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc) (rejecting defendant’s challenge where counsel accepted a media rights contract 
as a fee and also failed to withdraw in order to be available as a defense witness); United States v. Hearst, 
638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Sullivan to a situation where counsel’s representation of the 
defendant may be compromised by counsel’s pursuit of publication rights to a book).  See Shiner, supra 
note 28, at 971-72 (discussing personal interest conflicts). 
130 See Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900 (E.D. Mich. 2004).  In Rugiero the court stated: 
First, when an attorney is the subject of a criminal investigation by the same prosecutor 
who is prosecuting the attorney's client, there is a high probability of prejudice to the 
client as the result of the attorney's obvious self-serving bias in protecting his own liberty 
interests and financial interests. The liberty concern at issue is avoiding or minimizing 
imprisonment. The financial interests include avoiding disbarment and avoiding 
termination of the attorney's current representation of the client in question. The high 
probability of prejudice in this situation distinguishes this personal interest conflict from 
the weaker personal interest conflicts listed in the dicta in Mickens, e.g., book deals. 
Second, such prejudice is difficult to prove because the client could be harmed by the 
attorney's actions or inactions that are known only to the attorney. In short, the personal 
interest conflict at issue presents comparable difficulties to situations involving 
concurrent representation conflicts.  
330 F. Supp. 2d at 906 (citation omitted). 
131 See State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550, 561 (N.J. 2008) (noting that conflict caused by criminal charges 
pending against counsel would diminish public confidence in the justice system).  However, if no attorney-
client relationship exists at the time, the government may even use a defendant’s former counsel against the 
defendant.  In United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2008), the government enlisted the 
defendant’s former counsel to act as a confidential informant.  Counsel repeatedly emphasized to the 
defendant that he was a business partner on the deal and was not acting as a lawyer.  530 F.3d at 152-53. 
While the defendant had no claim that this arrangement violated his sixth amendment right to counsel, he 
argued that it was outrageous conduct that violated his right to due process.  530 F.3d at 152-53.  The Third 
Circuit rejected this argument.  530 F.3d at 152-55.  
132 In DeFalco, Judge Garth, dissenting, emphasized that counsel had already filed his appellate brief on 
behalf of the defendant before he was indicted and well before he pleaded guilty and was suspended from 
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issues that arise if counsel is under criminal investigation but not yet charged.  Section B 
considers the issues that arise when counsel is charged with a crime.  Section C assesses 
the situation in which the charges against counsel have been resolved.  Finally, Section D 
discusses the challenge of early intervention in these three situations.   
 
A. Counsel Under Criminal Investigation 
 
A conflict may arise if counsel is under investigation for possible criminal wrong-
doing even though counsel is not yet charged with a crime.133  The precise impact of the 
investigation on counsel may depend on factors such as the prosecutor’s involvement in 
the investigation, counsel’s awareness of the investigation, and the relationship between 
the investigation and counsel’s representation of the defendant.  However, even when the 
investigation is unrelated to the case against the client, if either the prosecutor or counsel 
is aware of the investigation, it may threaten counsel’s ability to deliver effective 
representation to the defendant.   
 
In some cases, a criminal investigation focusing on counsel is under-way but 
counsel is not aware of the investigation.134  In such cases, counsel will not necessarily 
confront a conflict of interest as a result of the investigation.  Of course, counsel will still 
suffer from a conflict if counsel’s criminal conduct relates in some way to the defendant’s 
case, thereby creating an incentive for counsel to direct the defense in such a way as to 
avoid disclosure of the criminal conduct or delay prosecution action against counsel.135  
However, even if counsel is not conflicted, the investigation may have a negative impact 
on defendant’s representation: the prosecutor’s conduct toward both counsel and the 
defendant may be influenced by the awareness that counsel is the object of criminal 
inquiry.136  For example, the prosecutor may be less willing to offer the defendant the 
opportunity to cooperate if the prosecutor regards as a criminal the lawyer through whom 
the communication would flow.  Thus even a criminal investigation unknown to counsel 
may impair the effectiveness of the defendant’s representation. 
 
If counsel is aware that she is under criminal investigation, the problem is more 
acute.137  Counsel’s awareness of the investigation will affect counsel’s interaction with 
                                                                                                                                                 
practice.  644 F.2d at 144-45.  Judge Garth did not discuss whether counsel had been aware of the criminal 
investigation while preparing the brief and whether that would have posed a greater problem.  
133 See Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding conflict of interest existed where 
counsel was under investigation for bribing law enforcement officers to reduce his client’s charges and had 
been given immunity by the prosecutor’s office responsible for the client’s charges, but affirming 
conviction because no adverse effect).  But see Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that counsel who was under investigation did not suffer from conflict of interest). 
134 See Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that counsel “did not believe 
himself to be under investigation at the time of the trial”). 
135 See United States ex rel. Stewart v. Scott, 501 F. Supp. 53, 55-57 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (discussing conflict 
where counsel planned the burglary with which defendant was charged and protected himself from 
incrimination at defendant’s trial). 
136 For further discussion of the impact on prosecution, see supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
137 See United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 61 7th  Cir. 1992) (suggesting that counsel who was under 
investigation by federal authorities faced conflict because "it was possible that as a result of the pressure of 
being investigated, [counsel] would either refrain from aggressive cross-examination during the trial in 
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both the prosecutor’s office and the defendant.138  Counsel’s actions will be influenced 
because every step counsel takes representing the defendant will be colored either by a 
desire to procure favor with the prosecution or by antipathy toward the prosecution.  
There are various ways such a situation may affect counsel’s representation.  First, a 
lawyer facing criminal investigation may attempt to improve her own relationship with 
the prosecutor’s office even when that involves actions that do not serve the defendant’s 
interest.139  Second, counsel may be reluctant to advise the defendant to plead guilty and 
cooperate with the government either out of fear that the defendant might then provide 
information inculpating counsel or out of hostility toward the prosecution.140  Third, 
counsel may structure the defense of the case and the questions addressed to the 
prosecution witnesses less favorably to the defendant in order to avoid eliciting 
information that would incriminate counsel.141  If counsel is accused of criminal conduct 
by the prosecution’s witnesses but is innocent, counsel may not be able to effectively 
plumb the issue on cross-examination since counsel would be placed in the role of 
witness for herself as well as advocate for the defendant.142  Fourth, counsel may have an 
incentive to drag out the defendant’s case, even to the defendant’s detriment, to delay 
                                                                                                                                                 
order that he might gain the favor of his potential prosecutors, or that he would be unduly hostile toward 
them, losing objectivity, and thus harm [the defendant]'s rapport with the jury").  
138 See Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that conflict of interest exists where 
counsel has to choose between advancing personal interests and advancing interests of client); Thompkins 
v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that attorney under investigation may defend clients 
less vigorously to avoid retaliation by prosecution); United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 
1979) (“We conclude that inherent emotional and psychological barriers created an impermissible potential 
of preventing appellate counsel from competing vigorously with the government.”).  See also United States 
v. Lafuente, 2008 WL 3849903 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that while a conflict of interest 
affecting representation can occur when attorney faces criminal charges in same court, evidence here was 
insufficient to support such finding).   
139 Armienti v. United States, 234 F.3d 820, 825-26 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that counsel “may, consciously 
or otherwise, seek the goodwill of the office for his own benefit” and that these attempts “may not always 
be in the best interest of the lawyer’s client”).  See also Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 
1992) (suggesting that attorney under investigation may “pull his punches”); Rugiero v. United States, 330 
F. Supp. 2d 900, 908-10 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (suggesting that counsel “pulled his punches” on the question 
of a government witness’ violation of the court’s sequestration order and also was influenced in his 
handling of the question of whether publicity about the investigation of counsel influenced the jurors who 
heard it).  But see Skinner v. Duncan, 2003 WL 21386032 at * 44 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (noting that 
counsel who was prosecuted for failure to provide client information to the grand jury had no reason to 
curry favor with prosecution).  In Skinner, the court also remarked on counsel’s reputation for vigorous 
advocacy, which the court viewed as inconsistent with the allegation that she was influenced by a conflict 
of interest.  2003 WL 21386032 at * 44 n.74. 
140 See United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1993); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 581 (9th 
Cir. 1988); Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (noting that counsel had 
incentive not to pursue plea negotiations for defendant where counsel was being investigated for failure to 
report cash payments from clients). 
141 See Fulton, 5 F.3d at 610 (stating “a spirited defense could uncover convincing evidence of the 
attorney’s guilt or provoke the government into action against the attorney”).  Even if the prosecution is 
already aware of counsel’s possible criminal activity, counsel may fear that more information will come to 
light through the defendant’s case.  But see Cerro v. United States, 872 F.2d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(reasoning that counsel had nothing to fear where the government was already aware of counsel’s possible 
criminal conduct). 
142 See Fulton, 5 F.3d at 610. 
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prosecution action against counsel.143  Finally, counsel may be unable to act as a skilled 
attorney simply because of the distraction of the accusation.144  
 
When counsel is actually implicated in or accused of criminal activity closely 
related to the defendant’s alleged illegal conduct, a particularly intense conflict arises.145  
The conflict and resulting harm to the defendant is likely to be so severe that counsel 
should not be permitted to represent the defendant.146  If counsel is suspected of the same 
criminal conduct with which the defendant is charged, the impact on counsel’s 
performance is likely to be pervasive and profound, given counsel’s strong self-interest in 
avoiding criminal liability.147  In such cases, the defendant may receive relief even if the 
issue is not raised until after conviction, but early intervention better protects both the 
defendant’s and the government’s interest.148   
 
When counsel’s suspected wrong-doing relates to counsel’s representation of the 
defendant, there is also likely to be a serious conflict of interest.  In such situations, 
counsel also has a strong interest in deterring the court or prosecution from exploring 
those aspects of the case related to counsel’s conduct, even when such exploration could 
benefit the defendant.149  For example, in Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp,150 
                                                 
143 See United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987); Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. 
Supp. 2d 900, 907-08 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (suggesting that counsel delayed the defendant’s trial against the 
defendant’s interest). 
144 See Fulton, 5 F.3d at 608 (informing defendant that if he proceeded with counsel who had been accused 
of criminal wrongdoing by one of the prosecution witnesses, counsel would be distracted and unable to 
cross-examine the witness on the issue).  
145 See United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1993) (counsel was accused of drug violation 
related to defendant’s charges); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (counsel was accused of 
buying stolen property from defendant); United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(counsel likely feared defendant would disclose counsel’s crimes if defendant cooperated and therefore 
could not provide defendant with impartial advice on whether to plead guilty and cooperate); State v. 
Chandler, 698 S.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Mo. 1985) (granting relief where counsel was suspected of same 
murder with which defendant was charged).  
146 Conversely, if counsel’s conduct is unrelated, the court may see no impact on the representation of the 
defendant.  See United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 749,755 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding counsel’s 
alleged criminal activity was not so related to charges that counsel must be disqualified). 
147 See United States v. Reeves, 892 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1990) (counsel was properly disqualified 
counsel where counsel was a target of the same investigation that had led to the defendant’s indictment, and 
the government planned to call the defendant before the grand jury to testify against counsel); State v. 
Chandler, 698 S.W.2d 844, 847-49 (Mo. 1985) (reversing conviction where co-counsel was charged with 
same murder as defendant). 
148 See, e.g., United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018, 1023 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that counsel’s potential 
liability for destruction of evidence created conflict of interest); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576,  583 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (holding defendant met Sullivan standard because counsel was accused of criminal conduct 
related to defendant’s robbery and stolen property charges); United States v. White, 706 F.2d 506, 507 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that counsel who was under investigation and later indicted for aiding defendant’s 
escape had conflict of interest). 
149See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146,156-57 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing conflict where attorney was 
under investigation for possible complicity in wrongdoing by defendant’s co-defendant); Rubin v. Gee, 292 
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 2002) (counsel functioned almost as accessories after-the-fact in defendant’s 
crime); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 394 A.2d 965, 968 (Pa. 1978) (discussing conflict where prosecution 
witness claimed counsel had taken illegal firearms from defendant as legal fee). 
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defense counsel was with the defendant in the house when the police heard flushing; later 
investigation suggested that cocaine had been disposed of through flushing.151  To focus 
responsibility on the defendant, the prosecution obtained a stipulation that her attorney, if 
called as a witness, would testify that he did not flush any toilets while he was in the 
house.152  Thus counsel faced two problems: (1) he was a witness for the prosecution 
against his client, and (2) he was at risk of prosecution for criminal charges arising from 
his actions in relation to the case.153  Thus the trial court, aware of the situation, should 
have removed counsel from the case. 
 
In some instances, counsel’s alleged wrongdoing comes to light when the 
prosecution interviews its witnesses in preparation for the defendant’s trial, and the 
witnesses inculpate counsel as well as the defendant.154  If a witness’ likely testimony 
will inform the jury in the defendant’s trial of counsel’s illegal conduct, counsel’s role in 
the case is compromised.  That disclosure will prejudice the jury against counsel and, 
possibly, the defendant, thus undermining the fairness of the proceeding.155  The public’s 
interest in the actual and apparent integrity of the proceeding as well as the defendant’s 
right to conflict-free representation come into play.156  In such a case, the court should be 
reluctant to permit counsel to continue in the case.157 
 
By contrast, some circumstances will diminish the risk of conflict.  If the 
investigation of counsel is wholly unrelated to the charges against the defendant, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
150 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.1984).  See also United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 146 (5th Cir. 1983) (trial 
court properly disqualified counsel where proper defense of defendant would have required counsel, a co-
conspirator, to inculpate himself). 
151 See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1984). 
152 See Zepp, 748 F.2d at 128-30  
153 748 F.2d at 127.  Of course, in a case like Zepp, counsel’s conflict is readily apparent to the court as well 
as the prosecutor.  748 F.2d at 136.  In Zepp, a pre-Mickens decision, the court concluded that the trial court 
had failed to fulfill its constitutional duty.  748 F.2d at 139. 
154 See United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 826 (11th Cir. 1982) (trial court’s disqualification of counsel 
was based on affidavits of two prosecution witnesses reflecting counsel’s criminal involvement with 
defendant).  See also United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that conflict of 
interest arose when government witness stated on the stand that he had knowledge that the defense lead 
counsel had been personally involved in heroin trafficking); United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 38 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (counsel withdrew because testimony of prospective prosecution witness implicated him in 
criminal conduct); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 578 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that government witness 
testifying against defendant stated in police report prior to trial that defense counsel had purchased stolen 
property).   
155 See United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828-29 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming order disqualifying 
counsel on grounds that testimony implicating him in defendant’s illegal conduct would erode public 
confidence in the justice system); United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 560-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(discussing likelihood that jury would learn of counsel’s questionable involvement with defendants).  This 
may be true even if there is no allegation that counsel violated the law.  See United States v. Melo, 702 F. 
Supp. 939, 941-43 (D. Mass. 1988) (discussing impact on public interest if prosecution evidence suggested 
that attorney was used by defendant in criminal enterprise, even though such evidence did not involve 
allegation of illegal conduct by counsel). 
156 See United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Melo, 702 F. Supp. 
939, 943 (D. Mass. 1988). 
157 See Hobson, 672 F.2d at 829 (trial court properly declined waiver). 
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court is less likely to find a conflict.158  Similarly, if a different prosecutor’s office has 
jurisdiction over the investigation of counsel, the argument for giving defendant post-
conviction relief or for disqualifying counsel is far weaker.  For example, in Taylor v. 
United States,159 the defendant was prosecuted and convicted in federal court.  After his 
conviction, counsel was indicted on state charges.160  Given the lack of relationship 
between the two prosecutors’ offices, the defendant was unable to establish the necessary 
nexus between counsel’s own difficulties with the criminal justice system and his 
representation of the defendant.161 Consequently, the court held that no conflict of interest 
interfered with counsel’s representation.162  The appearance of fairness would have been 
better served had the issue been raised early in the process. 
 
Finally, the courts should recognize that a conflict of interest may exist even when 
the court concludes that counsel who was under investigation while representing the 
defendant was not actually involved in improper conduct.163  If counsel was under 
suspicion and was aware that she was suspected of criminal wrongdoing while 
representing the defendant, the later determination that the suspicion was baseless does 
not retroactively neutralize the conflict.164  The conflict exists because of the accusatory 
relationship between the prosecution and counsel while the investigation is ongoing, at a 
time when neither side knows whether it will culminate in charges against counsel.165  
 
                                                 
158 Skinner v. Duncan, 2003 WL 21386032 at * 44 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (noting inter alia that 
attorney’s offenses were entirely unrelated to charges against defendant). 
159 985 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1993). 
160 Taylor v. United States, 985 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1993). 
161 See Taylor, 985 F.2d at 846. 
162 See Taylor, 985 F.2d at 846.  See also United States v. Rubirosa, 100 F.3d 943 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished opinion) (finding no per se conflict where counsel was indicted in federal district different 
from district in which defendant was being prosecuted). 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding conflict even though counsel 
had not engaged wrong-doing).  But see United States v. Knight, 680 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1982) (concluding 
that there was no conflict because counsel had not engaged in wrong-doing); Armienti v. United States, 313 
F.3d 807 (2d Cir. 2002) (determining that there was no conflict of interest when counsel’s own criminal 
investigation resulted in no charges being brought against him).   
164 In United States v. Taylor, 657 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1981), the court had originally remanded because: 
The record does disclose that documents pertaining to this trial were taken from the 
United States Attorney's office prior to the trial and that an investigation of this 
disappearance was underway when the trial began. Among those questioned were the two 
attorneys who represented Knight. On appeal it is argued that these attorneys were aware 
that they were under investigation and were probably suspected of having had the 
purloined documents in their possession at some time prior to the beginning of the trial. 
Knowing this, appellate counsel argues, these attorneys may have pressed the defense of 
Knight's claim with less vigor than they would have if these circumstances had not 
existed. They point to the fact that Knight neither took the stand nor offered any evidence 
at the trial.   
657 F.2d at 94 (citation omitted).   
In United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 519-20 (2d Cir. 1990), however, the Second Circuit 
concluded that no conflict arose where the prosecutor leveled  unfounded accusations that counsel had 
engaged in unethical conduct, and the trial court investigated and rejected the allegations during trial. 
165 See United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that conflict exists even if 
attorney is later determined to be innocent of wrong-doing). 
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B.  Counsel Charged With a Crime 
 
Allowing a criminal defendant to proceed through the criminal justice system 
represented by a lawyer who is also facing serious criminal charges poses serious 
problems.  It appears patently unfair, and some courts see an obvious conflict.166  On the 
other hand, some courts do not view counsel as laboring under a conflict of interest even 
when counsel is faced with charges pressed by the same prosecutor and brought before 
the same court as the defendant.167 
 
To determine whether the charges against counsel create a conflict of interest, the 
courts consider a range of factors.  A court is more likely to find a conflict if defense 
counsel’s criminal case is being handled by the same prosecutor,168 or office,169 or is 
before the same judge.170  The closer the connection between the prosecution of the 
defendant and the prosecution of counsel, the greater the risk of harm generated by a 
conflict of interest. 
 
An attorney facing criminal charges may experience more pressure to disserve the 
client than an attorney engaged in improper joint representation.171  The attorney’s self-
interest will weigh on the side of gaining favor with the prosecution, thus restraining 
                                                 
166 See State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550 (N.J. 2008) (establishing per se rule); United States v. McLain, 823 
F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding actual conflict exists when defense counsel was under 
investigation before and during defendant’s trial); People v. Waddell, 24 P.3d 3, 8-10 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that defense counsel had conflict of interest due to fact that he was under investigation by same 
district attorney as client, although defendant properly waived conflict); People v. Edebohls, 944 P.2d 552, 
556 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (finding conflict of interest exists when defense attorney is being prosecuted by 
same district attorney’s office as his client); 
Smith v. Hofbauer, 321 F.3d 809, 823 (6th Cir. 2002) (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting in part) (discussing 
magistrate judge’s conclusion that the conflict of interest “was obvious”).  In addition, permitting such 
representation will undermine the public’s confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.  
167 See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 756 S.W.2d 452, 299 (Ark. 1988) (concluding that counsel was “not 
involved in actively representing his own interest which may have conflicted with those of [the 
defendant]”). 
168 See, e.g., Smith v. Hofbauer, 321 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir. 2002). 
169 See United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting indictments processed by 
same United States Attorney’s office which prosecuted defendant); Beatty v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 2d 
454, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that conflict exists only if counsel is prosecuted by same agency or 
office as defendant); People v. Edebohls, 944 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. App. 1996) (noting that counsel was 
being prosecuted by the same office as the defendant); State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550, 561-62 (N.J. 2008) 
(adopting per se rule for cases in which counsel is being prosecuted by same office as defendant).  The 
court’s analysis may also depend on the bureaucratic structure of the particular prosecutor’s office.  See 
Hofbauer, 321 F.3d at 822 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting in part) (discussing whether it was customary for 
assistants in the Office to negotiate plea bargains with or without approval of their supervisors).  See also 
State v. Clark, 744 A.2d 109, 112 (N.J. 2000) (emphasizing that county prosecutor has supervisory 
authority over municipal prosecutors) (overruled on other grounds in State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425 (N.J. 
2002)). 
170 See, e.g., Hofbauer, 321 at 816; DeFalco, 644 F.2d at 136-37. 
171 Smith v. Hofbauer, 321 F.3d 809, 825 (6th Cir. 2002) (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting in part) (noting that 
such a conflict has “a stronger tendency to influence, if not compel, [the attorney] to refrain from actions 
potentially advantageous to his client that an effective counsel would take”).   
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counsel’s zeal in representing the defendant.172  Conversely, if counsel’s own case is 
infected by hostility between the prosecution and defense, the hostility may spread to the 
defendant’s case; counsel may be unable to interact with the prosecution in an 
appropriate professional manner.  Either way, counsel will face difficult choices about 
how to negotiate for the defendant and how aggressively to fight the charges.  If, during 
the proceedings against the defendant or shortly after their conclusion, counsel strikes a 
deal in counsel’s own case with the same prosecutor’s office that is prosecuting the 
defendant’s case, the circumstances suggest that the risk of reducing counsel’s own 
chances for favorable treatment inhibited counsel from providing a zealous defense.173   
 
While these problems are particularly intense if counsel is being prosecuted by the 
same office prosecuting the defendant, the risk of conflict exists even when the 
prosecution against counsel is being pursued by a different office.  Counsel will still be 
influenced by her own criminal difficulties.  She may be motivated to avoid irritating the 
prosecution, fearing that the prosecution would convey their opinion of her to the 
prosecutor handling the case.  Alternatively, she may be so hostile to the government that 
her relationship with the prosecutors handling the case against her client is affected. 
 
C.  Charges Against Counsel Resolved 
 
In some cases, the charges against counsel are largely resolved by the time 
counsel is handling the defendant’s case.  At least in theory, the impact of counsel’s own 
criminal case may diminish when counsel has been convicted and is awaiting sentencing.  
At that point, counsel’s incentive to curry favor with the prosecutor’s office is reduced, 
since whatever concessions the prosecution is willing to make are already established.174  
Nevertheless, counsel’s own involvement with the criminal justice system may continue 
to generate a conflict of interest and a risk of unfairness, even when the charges have 
been resolved.175 
 
In Stoia v. United States,176 defense counsel had previously faced federal charges 
in two district courts and entered into a plea agreement that provided, in part, that counsel 
would not represent any defendants charged with federal crimes.  Counsel’s 
representation of the defendant threatened to violate this term of the plea agreement and, 
                                                 
172 United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 1994); State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550, 559-63 (N.J. 
2008). 
173 See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 756 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Ark. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s claim where counsel 
struck a deal with the prosecutor’s office shortly after defendant was convicted); State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 
550, 561 (N.J. 2008) (applying per se rule where counsel was negotiating with prosecutor’s office on his 
own behalf at the same time he was representing the defendant). 
174 See, e.g., United States v. Mays, 77 F.3d 906, 908-09 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that counsel had a conflict where counsel had been prosecuted in a different federal district and 
had worked as an informant before being reinstated to the bar several months before he commenced his 
representation of the defendant). 
175 This article focuses only on charges that are close in time to the period of representation.  If counsel’s 
criminal problems have long been resolved, such a criminal infractions that occurred before counsel was 
admitted to the bar, there is no concern that they will have an ongoing effect on counsels ability to provide 
effective representation. 
176 22 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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during the post-conviction hearing, the court.177 Additionally, during the trial, counsel 
was under investigation for soliciting perjury and obstructing justice in connection with 
his representation of a codefendant. 178  The court concluded that counsel would be 
burdened by a conflict if he was at risk of violating his agreement and remanded the 
defendant’s case to determine whether counsel’s desire to hide this violation prohibited 
him from appearing as a witness at trial.179  
 
In Phillips v. Warden,180 counsel had been convicted on charges unrelated to the 
defendant’s case.  Counsel’s conviction for murdering his wife and the ensuing litigation 
were highly publicized in the district where the defendant was charged and tried.181  
While counsel challenged his conviction, he was not incarcerated and continued to 
practice law.  The defendant, having recently moved to the state, was oblivious to 
counsel’s conviction, and counsel was not forthcoming with that information until well 
into the process.182  Even when counsel informed the defendant of his status as a 
convicted murderer, counsel did not fully discuss with the defendant the problems this 
could pose for his representation.183  At the defendant’s trial, counsel did not ask the 
prospective jurors whether they were aware of his murder conviction.184  At first glance, 
this case does not appear to present a classic attorney self-interest conflict, where counsel 
is pulled by loyalty to the defendant on one hand and himself on the other.  However, a 
conflict existed because counsel was aware that his own notoriety could have a 
detrimental effect on the defendant’s case and that he should therefore move to withdraw 
from the case, but counsel’s financial self-interest prompted him to continue.185  The 
court concluded that counsel’s notoriety placed him in an untenably conflicted 
situation.186 
 
Thus, even when the charges against counsel have been resolved, the court should 
consider the ongoing effects of counsel’s prior charges and their impact on counsel’s 
ability to provide conflict-free representation.  If counsel’s involvement in the justice 
system threatens to bleed into the defendant’s case and burden counsel’s decision-
making, a conflict of interest exists. 
 
D.  Early Intervention Based on Counsel’s Criminal Involvement 
 
                                                 
177 Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 1994). 
178 Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir. 1994).  The defendant argued that the perjury 
investigation prevented counsel from allowing the defendant to testify in order to prevent the potential 
introduction of evidence adverse to counsel. 
179 The court remanded for a hearing to determine whether counsel was at risk of being in violation of the 
agreement.  Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 772-73 (7th Cir. 1994). 
180 595 A.2d 1356 (Conn. 1991). 
181 Phillips v. Warden, 595 A.2d 1356, 1360 (Conn. 1991). 
182 Phillips v. Warden, 595 A.2d 1356, 1362-63 (Conn. 1991). 
183 Phillips v. Warden, 595 A.2d 1356, 1364 n.12 (Conn. 1991). 
184 Phillips v. Warden, 595 A.2d 1356, 1364 (Conn. 1991). 
185 Phillips v. Warden, 595 A.2d 1356, 1374 (Conn. 1991). 
186 The court emphasized that counsel’s conflict was acute when he approached voir dire and had to 
determine the least harmful way of dealing with the jurors’ likely knowledge of his conviction. 
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Early intervention in these cases is often feasible and will serve to best protect the 
defendant and the fairness of the process.  If the issue is brought to the court’s attention 
early in the process, the court can assess the propriety of the continued representation.  
The court can then decide whether counsel is so compromised by the criminal 
investigation that counsel cannot continue in the case.  Even if the court does not 
conclude that counsel must be disqualified, early intervention permits the court to explain 
to the defendant the risks of proceeding with this attorney, allowing the defendant to 
waive the possible conflict or seek substitution of counsel.  To permit the issue to be 
raised as early as possible, the prosecution should routinely run a criminal record check 
on defense counsel to make sure counsel does not face prosecution elsewhere, a de 
minimis burden for the prosecution to assume.  However, in cases where counsel is still 
under investigation and not yet charged, early intervention may pose a challenge.  
 
Early inquiry into the problem will sometimes be the only way to protect the 
defendant and, at other times, will be the only way to avoid eventual reversal of the 
defendant’s conviction.187  But not all courts are receptive, and the defendant faces a 
daunting obstacle regardless of whether the court applies the Sullivan rule or the 
Strickland test.188  Even where danger signals suggest the counsel’s conflict had a 
negative impact, the defendant may fail to establish the specific adverse effect required 
for relief.189  The problems that arise because of defense counsel’s criminal problems and 
                                                 
187 Courts occasionally view a conflict based on counsel’s criminal problems as so severe that the defendant 
is entitled to relief.  See, e.g., Rubin v. Gee, 292 F.3d 396, 403-05 (4th Cir. 2002) (counsels’ conflict 
prevented them from providing testimony critical to the defense); Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766 (7th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987) (granting relief where counsel 
was under investigation by same office); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(granting relief where counsel’s numerous conflicts included both that he was awaiting sentencing on one 
set of charges and under investigation on another); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 582 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(granting relief where counsel was accused of buying stolen property from the defendant); Rugiero v. 
United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907-09 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (granting relief where the criminal case 
against counsel proceeded from investigation through indictment while counsel was representing the 
defendant);  State v. Chandler, 698 S.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Mo. 1985) (grating relief where counsel was 
suspected of murder with which defendant was charged).  One can argue for a per se rule of reversal.  One 
scholar has commented that when counsel “is the subject of an ongoing investigation or has some other 
special relationship with the prosecution that might lead counsel to place that relationship above the best 
interests of his client[,] [m]uch can be said for adopting in such cases ... a standard of per se 
ineffectiveness.” 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 11.9(d), at 939-40 (3d ed. 2007); see also id. § 11.9(d), at 
918 & nn. 174-75 (noting that some state courts have recognized per se conflicts). Without such a standard, 
“the issue becomes whether counsel could have done more than he or she did, which seems always to be 
the case.” Id. § 11.9(d), at 940. 
188 For further discussion of the Sullivan rule and the Strickland test, see supra notes 13-14, 20-23, 38-41 
and accompanying text. 
189 See, e.g., Armienti  v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 812-13 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding no deficiency in 
representation when retained counsel, under investigation thus allegedly suffering from a conflict, took 
over representation from the public defender initially assigned to defendant and never discussed the 
possibility of pleading guilty); Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 814-16 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
defendant’s claim where counsel sought to withdraw due to conflict); Sanchez v. State, 756 S.W.2d 452, 
298-99 (Ark. 1988) (finding counsel’s representation was not affected by the charge).  In Smith v. 
Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 811-812 (6th Cir. 2002), the defendant’s retained counsel, who was facing his 
own criminal charges, sought to withdraw from the defendant’s case on the eve of trial but was required to 
continue with the case through trial. 312 F.3d at 811. Counsel was replaced prior to sentencing “possibly 
because [his] license to practice law may have been suspended as of his date of conviction.”  However, 
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resulting conflict may be difficult to identify, isolate, and prove to have resulted from the 
adverse impact of the attorney’s conflicted situation.  If the court explores the conflict 
after the fact, counsel’s testimony that counsel’s own criminal involvement had no 
impact on the representation may alone be sufficient to defeat the defendant’s claim.190   
 
If counsel has been charged with a crime, so the charge is a matter of public 
record, disclosure and discussion of that fact in court poses no problem.  However, 
addressing counsel’s situation at the point where the investigation of counsel is ongoing 
poses some specific problems.  Depending on the nature and stage of the investigation, 
disclosure may 1) compromise the government’s effort to enforce the law, 2) harm 
counsel’s reputation and livelihood, perhaps unfairly, and 3) deprive the defendant of 
choice of counsel. 
 
In some cases, the prosecution is willing to disclose the existence of the 
investigation.  The prosecution may even move to disqualify counsel, arguing that a 
criminal investigation or charges creates a disabling conflict.191  In United States v. 
Gambino,192 for example, the prosecution asked the court to remove the defendant’s high-
profile counsel from the case, citing its ongoing investigation of counsel.193  If the 
prosecution openly raises the investigation, the court is freed from concern about 
disclosure and should explore the implications of the investigation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reviewing counsel’s representation up to that point, the Michigan courts found no evidence that “counsel 
actively lessened his defense as a result of his pending felony charge” and further concluded that the 
defendant had not demonstrated an actual conflict.  312 F.3d at 812.  Applying Strickland, the federal court 
denied relief.  
190 Reyes-Vejerano v. United States, 276 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2002) (counsel testified he was unaware he 
was under investigation and explained his tactical decisions at trial); Rubin v. Gee, 292 F.3d 396, 408-09 
(4th Cir. 2002) (Motz, J. dissenting) (disagreeing with majority assessment that defendant established 
adverse effect and summarizing testimony of counsel); United States v. Hoffman, 926 F. Supp. 659, 678 
n.39 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (counsel testified that he did not expect to be prosecuted, eliminating any argument 
that the alleged investigation had an adverse effect).  The determination of adverse impact depends on 
reconstructing the process by which counsel made decisions in the course of the case.  See also Burger v. 
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784-85 (1987) (noting that trial court had credited counsel’s testimony that his 
strategic choice was not influenced by conflict); Joy, supra note 12, at 42.  In Kemp, the Court explained 
why it should defer to the findings of the trial court: 
The district judge, who presumably is familiar with the legal talents and character of the 
lawyers who practice at the local bar and who saw and heard the witness testify, is in a 
far better position than we are to evaluate [an alleged conflict of interest].  
483 U.S. at 785. 
191 See, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also United States v. Levy, 
25 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the prosecution did not move to disqualify counsel but 
that after the prosecution repeatedly raised questions concerning counsel’s possible conflict based on 
concerns including counsel's status as a defendant awaiting his own sentencing in on unrelated criminal 
charges and counsel’s status as the object of a grand jury's investigation into his client's flight). 
192 838 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
193 The government also raised other conflicts.  Counsel had been determined to be house counsel to the 
Gotti crime family and disqualified in earlier decisions.  United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 749, 756 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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In some cases, however, the disclosure issue is more difficult.  The time line in 
Rugiero v. United States194 illustrates the barriers to disclosure of a possible conflict 
when counsel is under investigation but also underscores the importance of early 
disclosure by the prosecution.  In Rugiero two months before the defendant retained 
counsel, the government opened an investigation of counsel.195  Several months later, but 
eight months before defendant’s trial began, counsel learned of the investigation when he 
was subpoenaed by the grand jury conducting the investigation.196  While the defendant 
was on trial, the government was determining whether to charge counsel.197  The 
defendant first learned of the investigation only during jury deliberations in his case when 
local news reported that the attorney was the subject of a criminal investigation.198  
Between the time the defendant was convicted and the date of his sentencing, counsel 
was indicted.199  Counsel nevertheless represented the defendant at sentencing and argued 
on his behalf on direct appeal.200  Counsel then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 
twelve months incarceration.201  At each stage, the party or parties aware of the criminal 
investigation withheld that information from the defendant and the court.  When all the 
facts came to light, the defendant ultimately won a new trial.  
 
Even if counsel is merely the target of an investigation, the prosecution may be 
able to raise the issue.202  When the investigation is ongoing and not yet public, as in 
Rugiero, even disclosing that counsel is a target may compromise the government 
investigation or endanger witnesses.203  But that does not require the government to 
withhold the information entirely.  Instead, the prosecution may protect the defendant as 
well as the government interest by communicating with the court ex parte.204  The court 
can then conduct in camera review of the information provided to determine whether 
                                                 
194 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
195 Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
196 Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902 (E.D. Mich. 2004).  
197 Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
198 Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903 (E.D. Mich. 2004).  
199 Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
200 Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2004).  
201 Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2004).  
202 See, e.g., Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 813-14 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the government 
had raised the possible conflict in other cases handled by counsel while he was being investigated by the 
grand jury); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 1994) (prosecution raised concerns based on 
both counsel’s existing charges on which he was awaiting sentence and an ongoing grand jury investigation 
focused on counsel).  Of course, in some cases, even the prosecution is not aware of counsel’s conflict until 
after the trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 868 (2d Cir. 1984) (government learned of 
counsel’s possible criminal involvement only after conviction). 
203 See Green, supra note 57, at 334-36 (discussing prosecution’s failure to raise risk of conflict resulting 
from successive prosecution where to do so might endanger witness). 
204 See, e.g., Reyes-Vejerano v. United States, 276 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2002) (court reviewed DEA reports 
in camera to determine whether counsel was under investigation);  
United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1993) (government met ex parte with judge and revealed 
that a government witness had implicated defense counsel in criminal conduct); United States v. Register, 
182 F.3d 820, 828 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999) (magistrate held ex parte hearing to avoid forcing prosecution to 
disclose evidence against him to attorney under investigation the prosecution did not want to disclose to the 
attorney its evidence inculpating him).  
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there is a conflict and, if so, how much information must be disclosed.205  If the court 
fears that counsel’s representation will be impaired, the court must take steps to protect 
the defendant.  In some cases, the court may continue the case, allowing the government 
investigation to reach a point at which disclosure will not harm government interests.  
But in some cases, the court will have to disclose at least some of the allegations to 
counsel and the defendant in order to protect the defendant’s interests and explain its 
decision concerning counsel.206 
 
If counsel is already aware of the investigation, the prosecution should advise the 
court and the defendant in camera.  Once counsel knows of the investigation, disclosure 
to the court and defendant will not harm the government interest. 207  Indeed, the 
government may prefer to inform counsel and the court about the criminal investigation 
in order to address a problem that may otherwise undermine the conviction.208  In some 
cases, the government may want to use the information to bolster its motion to 
disqualify.209  The court can then either obtain a waiver from the defendant or allow the 
substitution of counsel.  By handling the matter in camera, the court can protect the 
defendant’s interests without harming counsel’s interests through public discussion of 
counsel’s possible criminal conduct.  In some cases, however, the court may need more 
information concerning the case against counsel than the prosecution is willing to reveal 
to counsel.  Even when the prosecution is willing to acknowledge the existence of an 
ongoing investigation, it may need to keep some details of information secret in order to 
protect the investigation or witnesses.210  If that is the case, the court may need to address 
the issue ex parte in camera. 
                                                 
205 However, the mere fact that the prosecution raises the issue suggests that their treatment of counsel will 
be affected by the existence of the investigation.  It is hard to believe that prosecutors will treat a lawyer 
who is also a suspected criminal with full professional courtesy.   
206 See, e.g., United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1993) (trial court insisted that information 
must be disclosed to defense counsel and the defendant). 
207 Briguglio v. United States, 675 F.2d 81, 82 (3d Cir. 1982) (counsel was aware of investigation but did 
not tell defendant); United States v. Cannistraro, 794 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (D.N.J. 1992) (counsel had 
received target letter informing him of grand jury investigation).  If disclosure to the defendant would 
compromise the investigation, the prosecution can seek a protective order. F.R. Crim. P. Rule 16 (d)(1) 
provides: 
At any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or 
inspection, or grant other appropriate relief. The court may permit a party to show good 
cause by a written statement that the court will inspect ex parte. If relief is granted, the 
court must preserve the entire text of the party's statement under seal. 
208 State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).  In Johnson, the prosecution knew its witness 
would implicate counsel in the defendant’s illegal activity and appropriately apprised the court and defense 
of the perceived conflict before trial, seeking either a waiver or an order disqualifying counsel.  
209 See, e.g., United States v. Cannistraro, 794 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (D.N.J. 1992) (government sent counsel 
target letter invoking the investigation as one basis for its motion to disqualify counsel on grounds of 
conflict).  See also United States v. Levine, 794 F.2d 1203, 1205 (7th Cir. 1986) (prosecution opposed 
substitution of counsel because counsel had been implicated in defendant’s criminal conduct and defendant 
appeared to be creating a conflict; prosecution also supplied defendant with recording of conversation 
inculpating attorney). 
210 United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 868 (2d Cir. 1984) (government refused to provide court details 
of investigation, but instead urged court to assume that counsel was implicated in criminal conduct similar 
to the defendant’s); United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 749, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (court met with 
prosecutors in camera to discuss relationship between investigation of counsel and the defendant’s case). 
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Cases in which the prosecutors know about the investigation but counsel is not 
aware that she is being investigated and cannot be told without compromising the 
government interest pose the greatest challenge.  Even in these cases, however, the 
prosecution should raise the issue with the court.  The prosecutor should be required to 
disclose the circumstances to the judge ex parte, allowing the judge to seek a solution that 
protects both the government’s interest in the secrecy of the investigation and the 
defendant’s interest in appropriate representation.  Finding an appropriate solution in 
these cases will not be easy.  If the court disqualifies counsel on the basis of information 
not shared with the defense, the defendant may later argue that the process violated the 
right to counsel of choice.211  Conversely, if the court permits counsel to continue in the 
case, the defendant’s representation may be compromised.  But the judge, not the 
prosecutor alone, should determine how to address the problem. 
 
Of course, in some cases a criminal investigation of counsel is ongoing but the 
particular prosecutor is not aware of the investigation.  If the investigation is being 
pursued by a different office or even a separate unit within the same office, the prosecutor 
handling the defendant’s case is unlikely to have access to that information.  The 
prosecutor may not even be aware of an investigation overseen by prosecutors in the 
same office.  The secrecy that attends criminal investigation ordinarily precludes the 
implementation of any system of pre-charge information sharing.  In theory, each office 
could maintain a database of lawyers under investigation.  In reality, such a database 
would be both unfeasible and undesirable.  Requiring prosecutors to compile such a 
database could force them to label an attorney as a possible defendant earlier in the 
investigative process than they might otherwise.  This practice could skew the 
investigation as well as hamper the investigating prosecutor’s pre-charge dealings with 
the attorney under investigation.  It might also unfairly tarnish the reputation and practice 
of an attorney who is ultimately not charged.  In addition, the database itself might be 
vulnerable to hacking and therefore poses a security challenge.  In these cases, the harms 
inherent in establishing a means of addressing the conflict outweigh the likelihood that a 
conflict will cause harm to the defendant or the public’s interest.  When the prosecutor is 
not aware of the investigation of counsel, early intervention will not be possible unless 
counsel herself is aware of and raises the issue.  
 
One concern if the courts intervene early and protect defendants by disqualifying 
counsel is the negative impact on counsel’s practice.212  When a conflict based on 
counsel’s criminal situation comes to light, the trial court should give the defendant the 
option of seeking new counsel and may refuse to accept a waiver of the conflict.  Further, 
other clients may learn of counsel’s problems and opt not to continue being represented 
by a lawyer who himself was under investigation.  Thus, if the attorney’s practice is 
primarily criminal defense, disqualifying counsel from representing criminal defendants 
                                                 
211 See, e.g., United States v. Duklewski, 567 F.2d 255, 257 (4th Cir. 1977) (concluding that defendant’s 
right to counsel of choice was violated and remanding case for further inquiry). 
212 United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1979) (Garth, J., dissenting) (Sloviter, J., 
dissenting) (attorney under indictment is protected by presumption of innocence). 
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and airing counsel’s criminal situation could be devastating.213  The court must handle the 
determination relating to continued representation with due regard to counsel’s reputation 
and financial well-being, recognizing in pre-conviction cases that counsel is presumed 
innocent and in pre-charge cases the counsel may never be charged with any crime.214  
   
VI.  Raising the Conflict: The Prosecutor’s Duty 
 
In most cases involving either government employment or criminal investigation 
of defense counsel, the problem will not be apparent to the court or the defendant and 
therefore must be raised by either defense counsel or the prosecution.215  
 
Of course, the primary burden rests on defense counsel to identify and address 
potential conflicts of interest.216  In cases where defense counsel’s employment or 
                                                 
213 The fact that counsel in Rugiero never revealed the investigation to the defendant after he became aware 
of it reflects counsel’s strong interest in preserving his income stream and his reputation.   
214 See, e.g., Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that counsel was 
investigated for four years but never charged).  But see United States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding trial court could properly disqualify counsel where judge “believed” counsel was target 
of criminal investigation involving defendant). 
215 See also Glassman, supra note 9, at 969 (discussing difficulty of identifying conflicts that do not arise 
from concurrent representation).  Neither the court nor the defendant can be expected to identify these types 
of problems. See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 1994) (illustrating how difficult it may be 
for a judge to recognize the presence of conflict issues).  In Levy, the case was reassigned several times, 
and even though the prosecution raised its conflict concerns with the first judges, the judge who ultimately 
presided over the trial was unaware of the conflict issues and consequently did not address them.  United 
States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 1994).  Unlike joint representation, defense counsel’s 
employment or criminal problems do not reveal themselves in the courtroom during the course of the 
defendant’s case.  See, e.g., United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 133 (3d Cir. 1979) (explaining that 
Third Circuit was unaware that counsel representing defendant on appeal had pleaded guilty and been 
suspended from practice); Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (conflicted counsel did 
not enter an appearance and trial court had no obligation to be aware of his out of court contribution to the 
defense).  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) imposes an obligation on the court to inquire into a 
conflict only when a concern regarding joint representation is obvious.  In Mickens, the Court suggests that 
Rule 44 supports differentiation among different types of conflicts. 535 U.S. at 175.  See also Shiner, supra 
note 28, at 993; Glassman, supra note 9, at 967-68 (discussing relationship between Rule 44 and 
constitutional rules).  To the contrary, the rule of procedure simply singles out those situations in which the 
court can be expected to recognize the conflict -- cases in which the jointly represented defendants are 
before the same judge.  It does not address any other conflict problems because the court has no reliable 
access to information in other types of cases.  Even when the attorney’s predicament is reported in the 
media, the court and defendant may not learn of the problem. See Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 
(7th Cir. 1992) (counsel apparently relied on the news reports to inform the defendant of the issue; neither 
the defendant nor the court knew). 
216 Under the Rules of Professional Responsibility, the principal burden falls on defense counsel.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RULE 1.7. See generally Green, supra note 57,at 328-31; see 
also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980) (recognizing defense counsel has ethical obligation to 
avoid conflicting representations); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978) (“[D]efense 
attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of the 
problem.”).  In some cases, defense counsel properly raises the conflict.  See, e.g., State v. Almanza, 910 
P.2d 934, 934-35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing conviction where counsel asked to withdraw because his 
law firm was prosecuting defendant in separate case and trial court required counsel to continue with case). 
Certainly law firms’ and public defenders’ conflict checks should include previous or concurrent 
employment as a prosecutor.  However, defense counsel is sometimes blind or even resistant to the conflict.  
Conflicts and Prosecutors – page 44 
problems with the criminal justice system threaten a conflict, the obvious course of action 
is for defense counsel to fulfill her ethical obligation and inform both the client and the 
court of the problem, thereby allowing the court to address the conflict early in the 
client’s criminal case.217  The courts rely on counsel to act ethically,218 but many conflict 
cases arise because counsel fails to make appropriate and timely disclosure.219  Moreover, 
even if counsel identifies the conflict and raises the question in private conversation with 
                                                                                                                                                 
In State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 473-74 (Tenn. 2003), defense counsel tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
the court that he should be permitted to represent the defendant even though the prosecutor, armed with an 
advisory opinion from the state Board of Professional Responsibility expressing the view that counsel 
could not unethically represent the criminal defendant while also serving as a prosecutor, moved to 
disqualify counsel.  114 S.W.3d at 473. 
217 See JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER § 13:3, N.17 
(2d ed. 1996).  According to the ABA, “[d]efense counsel should disclose to the defendant at the earliest 
feasible opportunity any interest in or connection with the case or any other matter that might be relevant to 
the defendant’s selection of a lawyer to represent him or her or counsel’s continuing representation.  Such 
disclosure should include communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to 
appreciate the significance of any conflict or potential conflict of interest.”  Id. § 13:3, n.17 (citing ABA 
Stds, The Defense Function Std 4-3.5(b)). Further, although counsel’s “primary duty is to advance the 
client’s interests,” when these interests conflict with the administration of justice, this duty must yield to 
the public duty and counsel must disclose the conflict to the court.  Hall, supra at § 3:6.  Finally, it is 
recommended that counsel fully disclose any potential conflict to a defendant in order to save “time and 
trouble later in cutting off ineffective assistance claims because of an allegedly undisclosed conflict of 
interest.”  Hall, supra at § 13:3.  See also United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that attorney was under ethical obligation to inform client of ongoing criminal investigation and the 
possibility it would affect attorney’s judgment while counsel for client).  See also Thompkins v. Cohen, 
965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that if judge was aware of criminal allegations against attorney in 
his court, he must inquire and determine whether defendant wishes to continue representation); United 
States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that individuals are free to waive constitutional 
protections so long as such waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent). 
218 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167-68 (2002) (a court performing the threshold inquiry into a 
conflict claim must keep in mind the principle that “defense counsel is in the best position to determine if a 
conflict exists.”); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987) ("[W]e generally presume that the lawyer is 
fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client."); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 347 (1980) (trial courts rely on “the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel”); United 
States v. Kossak, 275 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530 (D. Del. 2003) (“The Government is entitled to presume that 
[counsel] would act in an ethical manner in dealing with any perceived conflicts.”). 
219 See, e.g., Armienti v. United States, 234 F.3d 820 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that counsel did not inform 
defendant of counsel’s own criminal investigation but defendant discovered it when he inquired about 
papers that counsel was reading); United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(explaining that conflict arose when defendant had no knowledge that his defense counsel had been 
involved in similar criminal activity to which defendant was convicted); United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 
132, 134 (3d. Cir. 1980) (explaining that defendant was unaware that his defense counsel had entered a 
guilty plea for conspiracy and had subsequently been suspended from practicing law in the United States 
District Court of New Jersey); Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902 (E.D. Mich. 2004) 
(noting that defendant became aware that his defense counsel had been under criminal investigation 
through the local news broadcast).  In State v. Cottle, 946 A.2d 550, 552-53 (N.J. 2008), defense counsel’s 
plea agreement imposed obligations on him in addition to his ethical responsibility.  The agreement 
required counsel to obtain from each client in a criminal case written acknowledgment that he had informed 
the client that he was participating in the court’s pretrial intervention program and also required counsel to 
provide a copy of the acknowledgement to the prosecutor’s office as well as the pretrial program.  Despite 
these obligations, he did not inform the defendant, a juvenile, or the defendant’s family of his own criminal 
situation.  See also Green, supra note 57, at 349 (noting that defense attorneys do not always follow ethical 
duties). 
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the defendant, problems may arise.  The defendant may not be able to assess the possible 
impact or determine an appropriate course of self-protective action, and the record may 
not clearly establish that the defendant consented.220  Even when the conflict issue is 
raised and addressed in open court, conflicted counsel sometimes aggressively seeks to 
remain in the case.221 
 
Therefore the prosecution should have a duty to identify and raise these conflicts.  
The prosecutor has access to key information in these cases and therefore should bear 
responsibility for avoiding conflicted defense representation.  Given the importance of 
early intervention to protect the fairness of the process and the defendant’s right to 
effective representation, the law should require prosecutors to seek out information 
concerning these two types of possible conflict and, if a problem exists, to call it to the 
court’s attention.   
 
Prosecutors can identify and raise these problems early in the process.  
Addressing the conflict early is critical because the risk of impact is both pervasive and 
subtle and the impact is extremely difficult to evaluate after the case has been resolved.  
When the conflict is disclosed to the trial court in a timely manner, the court has the 
opportunity to evaluate the specific alleged conflict in the context of the particular case 
and, if appropriate, either disqualify counsel or accept a waiver from the defendant.222  
Failure to address the problem early in the case puts both the fairness of the proceeding 
and the effectiveness of the defense representation in jeopardy.  Even delay in raising the 
issue may result in a mistrial or reversal, forcing the defendant through a second 
proceeding.223   
 
                                                 
220 See, e.g., Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 578 (9th Cir. 1988) (counsel who was accused by a 
government witness of having purchased stolen goods mentioned the accusation to defendant, but “did not 
point out a potential conflict of interest); Sanchez v. State, 756 S.W.2d 452, 298 (Ark. 1988) (appearing to 
credit counsel’s testimony that he told defendant of his pending charges, but not mentioning any discussion 
of issue in open court). 
221 See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 150-51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (outlining procedural history of 
case throughout which defense counsel sought to continue representing defendant despite several arguable 
conflicts raised by the prosecution, at one point misrepresenting to the court that the defendant had waived 
the issue in a colloquy); State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Tenn. 2003) (defense counsel tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade the court that he should be permitted to represent the defendant even though the 
prosecutor, armed with an advisory opinion from the state Board of Professional Responsibility expressing 
the view that counsel could not unethically represent the criminal defendant while also serving as a 
prosecutor, moved to disqualify counsel).   
222 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1984) (the prosecutor raised the issue and it 
was discussed on the record).  When the court becomes aware of the situation, the court should apprise the 
defendant of the relevant facts. See, e.g., People v. Waddell, 24 P.3d 3, 6-7 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (noting 
that same judge was presiding over criminal proceedings against counsel and those against defendant and 
obtained waiver from defendant).  Oddly, courts do not always do so.  See, e.g., People v. Gaines, 716 
N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting that trial court was informed when counsel took a job 
with the prosecutor’s office and permitted counsel to withdraw but did not inform defendant or seek a 
waiver).  For a further discussion of waiver of conflict, see supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.  For 
a further discussion of disqualification of counsel, see supra notes 67-73. 
223 Green, supra note 57, at 336 
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The government has a special interest in ensuring the fairness of the process as 
well as the legitimacy of the outcome.224  As a result, the prosecution should raise these 
conflicts, and should do so early in the process, to permit the court to address the conflict, 
avoiding unfairness to the defendant and eliminating a possible ground for later 
challenging the conviction.225  Prosecutorial discretion should be constrained by the 
obligation to raise the conflict.  The prosecution should not be free to refrain from 
disclosing the problem in some cases and to raise the issue only in those cases in which 
the prosecution hopes to gain an advantage by moving to disqualify defense counsel.226  
The prosecution should instead be required to act even when the prosecutor does not see 
any gain for the government or any strong risk to the defendant; only an open airing of 
the issues whenever either of these problems exists can protect the defendant and assure 
the fairness of the process.   
 
One could caution against inviting the prosecutor or the court to be an officious 
intermeddler, but imposing the burden on the prosecutor will often be the only path to 
early intervention.227  In Strickland, the Court noted concern that too demanding a 
                                                 
224 See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 649 (1974); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 87 
(1935) (explaining that prosecutor has high obligation to see that justice is done); see generally Flowers, 
supra note 74, at 728-733 (discussing role of prosecutor).  
225 See United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1996) (pointing out that prosecution could have 
saved a lot of trouble by raising the conflict early in the proceedings).  See also United States v. Holley, 
826 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir.) (suggesting that prosecutor should remind court when F.R. Crim. Pro. 44 
applies); United States ex rel. Vriner v. Hedrick, 500 F. Supp. 977, 983 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (suggesting that 
prosecutor should raise issue of conflict based on joint representation). 
226 In some cases, the prosecution aggressively seeks to disqualify counsel to serve its own interest.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Cannistraro, 794 F. Supp. 1313, 1323-24 (D.N.J. 1992) (government identified three 
grounds for the successful motion to disqualify, and defendant argued that some of government’s 
arguments were disingenuous); United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (recognizing 
that government may have ulterior motive in moving to disqualify counsel); Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 
S.W.3d 117 (Ky. 1999) (granting mandamus at prosecution request ordering trial court to disqualify 
counsel where counsel’s associate had previously handled the case for the Commonwealth).  See also 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (remarking that trial courts are aware of and should take 
into account the possibility that the government will “manufacture” a conflict to disqualify a particular 
defense attorney); United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820, 833 (11th Cir. 1999) (defendant argued that the 
evidence against counsel was tenuous and claimed that prosecution made the motion to disqualify in bad 
faith; appellate court deferred to trial court’s assessment).  See also Ephraim Margolin & Sandra Coliver, 
Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal Defense Counsel, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 229 (1982) (stating that 
the government typically brings a disqualification motion to “disqualify the most competent lawyers and 
firms”); Green, supra note 57, at 354 (advocating limitations on the prosecution’s use of disqualification 
motions).   
227 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983) (suggesting that opposing 
party’s allegation of conflict should be “viewed with caution”); Darryl K. Brown, Executive Branch 
Regulation of Criminal Defense Counsel and the Private Contract Limit on Prosecutor Bargaining, 57 
DEPAUL L. REV. 365, 374-79 (2008) (discussing prosecutorial incentives to restrict defense effectiveness); 
Green, supra note 57, at 354 (stating that there should be guidelines governing and limiting use of 
disqualification motions in an effort to restrain prosecutors from filing for improper purposes).  Professor 
Green later states that in order to assure that disqualification motions do not create a perception of 
unfairness, their filing should be limited to cases in which “‘both the likelihood and the dimensions of the 
feared conflict are substantial.’”  Green, supra note 57, at 361 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 
153, 166 (1982) (Marshall, J. dissenting)).  These conflicts should be such that if counsel “were to continue 
in the representation, defense counsel would probably become engaged in significant ethical misconduct 
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standard might intrude excessively into the relationship between the defendant and 
defense counsel and interfere with counsel’s ability to make appropriate decisions.228  
However, the prosecutor can flag the two types of conflicts involved here without 
drawing either herself or the court into evaluating and overseeing counsel’s decision-
making.  The prosecutor raises the possible conflict on the basis of objective indicators 
outside the attorney client relationship, and the intervention does not entail any 
assessment of counsel’s performance.  A conflict which is raised early in the process will 
be resolved either by replacing counsel with an un-conflicted attorney or by establishing 
a valid waiver on the record.  Either way, no ongoing scrutiny of counsel’s representation 
will be required.  Inquiry into counsel’s performance is necessary only if the issue is 
raised post-conviction and the court must then determine the impact of the situation on 
counsel’s representation. 
 
The obligation should be grounded in the prosecutor’s general duty to see that 
justice is done and that the trial is fair.229  There is little support for imposing a 
constitutional duty on the prosecution to inform the defendant or the court of potential 
conflicts on the part of defense counsel.230  It could be argued that due process requires 
                                                                                                                                                 
which would adversely affect . . . defense counsel’s representation.”  Green, supra note 57, at 361.  The 
shortcoming of his approach is that it entrusts to the prosecutor the task of assessing the risk to the fairness 
of the process and the defendant. When it appears that the prosecution is using a motion to disqualify for 
strategic reasons, the courts should approach the question with caution.  In some cases, the defendant may 
be able to insist on accommodations in the government’s case to avoid forcing counsel’s withdrawal.  See 
United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting that counsel could have made such a 
motion rather than withdrawing); United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1986) (once 
defendant agreed to stipulate to relevant facts, counsel should not have been disqualified on grounds he 
would be called as prosecution witness). 
228 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-90 (1984). See also Green, supra note 57, at 341 
(discussing difference between prosecutor detecting defense counsel’s incompetence and counsel detecting 
risk of conflict). 
229 Green, supra note 57, at 336-37, 355.  See also United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 801 (8th Cir. 
2006) (explaining that government informed district court that defense counsel was under FBI investigation 
and district court properly removed defense counsel); West Virginia ex rel. Humphries v. McBride, 647 
S.E.2d 798, 804 (W. Va. 2007) (explaining that State raised issue of conflict of interest at trial and 
requested that defense counsel step aside).  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 comment 
(2003) states: 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate.  The responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant 
is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence.   
230 See United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 812 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s argument 
that prosecution had duty to apprise him of counsel’s conflict); Cerro v. United States, 872 F.2d 
780, 787 (7th Cir. 1989) (considering prosecution’s duty where government witnesses had 
implicated counsel in criminal conduct, and noting that whether the prosecutor has a duty to 
inform is “an open question” but finding no violation in the case); United States v. Iorizzo, 786 
F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986) (suggesting that prosecution should have moved to disqualify counsel due 
to prior representation of key witness, but finding no constitutional duty to do so).  But see United 
States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 266, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (suggesting in passing that the 
prosecution has a duty to disclose potential defense conflicts to the court).  See also United States 
v. Mitchell, 572 F. Supp. 709, 713-14 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (rejecting defendant’s argument but 
suggesting that prosecution violated duty by failing to disclose conflict threatened by calling 
counsel’s former client as prosecution witness).   
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that the prosecutor disclose facts in the government’s possession that raise a risk of a 
serious conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel.  However, a constitutional duty 
would add nothing to the defendant’s constitutional protection.  Currently, the defendant 
can get relief if counsel’s conflict prejudiced the outcome – either under the Sullivan 
standard, benefiting from presumed prejudice or under Strickland, making a showing of 
incompetence and prejudice.  If the Court recognized a constitutional duty on the part of 
the prosecution, the test would undoubtedly include the requirement that the defendant 
show that some harm – prejudice – flowed from the prosecutor’s failing.  The defendant 
would have to demonstrate that, had the prosecution disclosed the information about 
counsel’s situation, the result of the proceeding would likely have been different.  This 
showing would entail essentially the same analysis as that the courts currently apply 
when a defendant raises a conflict of interest after conviction.  
 
Instead, the rules of professional responsibility should impose on the prosecutor 
the duty to identify and raise these types of conflict.  The prosecutor should be required 
to make the necessary inquiry concerning counsel’s government employment or criminal 
problem and, having done so, to inform the court.  Such a rule would increase the 
likelihood that the defendant’s and the public’s interest would be protected by early 




The two types of conflicts of interests considered in this article - when defense 
counsel has an employment relation to the prosecutor’s office and when defense counsel 
faces criminal investigation or charges – should give rise to an obligation on the part of 
the prosecutor to disclose relevant information to the court and the defendant.  Both these 
situations threaten the defendant’s representation and the actual as well as apparent 
fairness of the proceeding.  Yet only in extreme cases, do these types of conflicts result in 
reversal of a conviction.  As a result, early intervention by the court is critical. 
 
In the situations that generate these types of conflict, the prosecution generally 
has ready access to information pertinent to the conflict, and neither the court nor the 
defendant is likely to be aware of the problem.  While defense counsel generally bears the 
primary obligation to raise the possible conflict, counsel cannot be relied upon to disclose 
the essential information to the court or even to the defendant.  As a result, the 
prosecution must also be given responsibly for disclosing the problematic situation.  
Imposing the obligation of disclosure on the prosecution will increase the likelihood that 
courts will be able to address these types of conflict early and appropriately.   
